A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to There by Friedman, Stephen J
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-1984
A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting
from Here to There
Stephen J. Friedman
Pace Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Friedman, Stephen J., "A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to There" (1984). Pace Law Faculty Publications.
Paper 118.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/118
Maryland Law Review 
VOLUME 43 1984 NUMBER 3 
O Copyright Maryland Law Review, Inc. 1984 
A NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE* 
" We decide what business we want to be in, and then we get around the 
laws. ' ' 
- Wordr of a Senior fice President for 
Strategic Planning at a mqor 
moncy-center bank.' 
This Article provides a framework for developing a new regulatory 
paradigm for the financial services industry. After introductory com- 
ments about the obsolescence of the current regulatory system, it briefly 
explores the historical development of such significant regulatory 
themes as the dual banking system, multiple federal regulators, the sepa- 
ration of commercial and investment banking, restrictions on interstate 
banking, and the special character of banks. Next, following a review of 
previous attempts to restructure financial regulation, it concludes that 
the creation of a new regulatory paradigm has become necessary, and 
The precursor to this Article was delivered by Mr. Friedman as a lecture to dedicate 
the opening of Westminster Hall at the University of Maryland School of Law in May 1983. 
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Paul S. Novak of the Board of Editors of 
the Maryland Law Review. 
** A.B., Princeton University, 1959; J.D., Harvard University, 1962. Mr. Friedman is a 
member of Debevoise & Plimpton,New York City. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of the Treasury, 1977-79 and a member of the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion, 1980-8 1. 
*** B.A., Concordia College, 1967; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1972; J.D., Yale Univer- 
sity, 1978. Ms. Friesen is an associate with Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City. 
1. The Brauc New Worldof Superb&, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 1983, at 61 [hereinafter cited 
as The Braw New World]. 
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suggests that the process of paradigm-building must begin with an iden- 
tification of desirable regulatory goals. Finally, the Article proposes that 
the most appropriate means for achieving these goals would be through 
consistent regulation of similar financial functions regardless of institu- 
tional type. 
The financial marketplace2 is governed by a regulatory system that 
2. In using the term "financial marketplace," we refer to the mechanisms for accumulat- 
ing and allocating savings in the capital markets, the stock and commodities exchanges, com- 
mercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, credit unions, investment 
companies, securities firms, and insurance companies. We shall speak of "financial institu- 
tions," "financial intermediaries," and the provision of "financial services." Some observers 
have drawn careful distinctions between "financial enterprises" (institutions) and "financial 
intermediaries." See Clark, Thc Fedcal Income Taration oJFinanciaL fntcmcdiancs, 84 YALE L.J. 
1605, 1605 n.1 (1975). Clark cites R. GOLDSMITH, FINANCIAL ~NTERMEDIAR~ES IN THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY SINCE 1900, at 50-51 (1958), who states that "financial enterprises . . . 
[include] all economic units . . . that are primarily engaged in the holding of and trading in 
intangible assets (claims and equities)." Clark notes that intermediation is simply "the pro- 
cess whereby savings are channeled to investors through intermediaries rather than directly." 
Clark, suplo, at 1605 n.2. 
Since we are concerned with other functions as well as intermediation, we shall use 
the term "financial institution" unless the context clearly focuses on the intermediation func- 
tion. Likewise the term "financial services" will refer to delivery of products and performance 
of functions generally associated with financial institutions. 
Admittedly, the descriptive terminology for the various types of participants in the 
financial marketplace has not matured to precise use and some words would seem to be used 
interchangeably depending upon the source. Consider, for example, the following excerpt 
from a 1982 U.S. Government publication which provides an alternative way of describing 
the financial marketplace in terms of the participants and the functions performed. 
[Flinancial institutions and nonfinancial institutions [together] make up our eco- 
nomic universe. The major distinction between the two is that the bulk of the assets 
of nonfinancial [institutions] is in the form of real assets, such as plant, equipment, 
and inventories of goods, while most of the assets of financial [institutions] take the 
form of paper claims. 
Financial [institutions] can, in turn, be divided into financial intermediaries 
and firms engaged in direct financing. Financial intermediaries are firms that place 
themselves between ultimate lenders and ultimate borrowers by purchasing the pri- 
mary securities of the latter and issuing claims against themselves for the portfolios 
of ultimate lenders. Direct financing involves the marketing of primary securities in 
such forms as stocks, bonds, and mortgages to those desiring to purchase such securi- 
ties. The principal direct financing institutions are brokerage firms and investment 
[banking firms]. 
Financial intermediaries can further be divided into depository and non- 
depository institutions. The four kinds of depository intermediaries are commercial 
banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. Non- 
depository financial intermediaries consist of contractual savings institutions, on the 
one hand, and other financial intermediaries on the other. Of the contractual sav- 
ings institutions, the most important are life insurance companies, casualty insur- 
ance companies, private pension funds, and government pension funds. The 
remaining intermediaries include finance companies and mutual funds (or invest- 
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developed largely in response to particular historical needs. Increas- 
ingly, this system has failed to provide intelligent and uniform adminis- 
tration of the statutes that affect financial institutions and functions. 
Although its causes, extent, and cure are sources of disagreement, regu- 
latory obsolescence is acknowledged by representatives of most tradi- 
tional financial institutions-commercial banks, investment companies, 
and insurance companies--as well as by representatives of the regula- 
tory agencies responsible for the supervision of such  institution^.^ One 
recent report noted that "[tlhe depression-era system of regulation that 
was established in response to a particular set of historic conditions no 
longer meets the needs of the public and has resulted in a highly frag- 
mented and antiquated banking ~ystem."~ Another report stated that 
"[tlhe revolution occurring in the financial services market is rapidly 
escalating while the regulated institutions, particularly banks and bank 
holding companies, remain fettered by a burdensome regulatory struc- 
t ~ r e . " ~  In introducing proposed reform legislation, Senator William 
ment companies), of which the most rapidly growing component has been money 
market funds. 
J. ALLEN, THE CHANGINC WORLD OF FINANCIAL ~NTERMED~ARIES AND RELATED INSTITU- 
TIONS: SURVEY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
(CRS Rep. No. 82-210E, Dec. 30, 1982) (on file with the Mary(ad Lou) Rcuicw). 
3. Set, c.g., Letter from Investment Company Institute to Task Group on Regulation of 
Financial Services (Bush Task Group) (Apr. 4, 1983) ("[Tlhe single major regulatory problem 
[is] the tremendous and illogical disparity, on both the federal and state levels, between the 
regulation of mutual funds and the regulation of all other types of pooled investment me- 
dia."); Letter from National Association of State Savings & Loan Supervisors to Bush Task 
Group (Apr. 1, 1983) (arguing that separation of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is needed and state-chartered institu- 
tions should be freed from "illegal and unwarranted subordination to federal supervision"); 
Letter from Donald L. Rogers, President of the Associaton of Bank Holding Companies, to 
Bush Task Group (Mar. 11, 1983) ("The ability to offer [securities, insurance, and real estate 
services] is essential if bank holding companies are to remain viable competitors."); Statement 
of American Banker's Association Task Force on Restructuring the ~ e d i r a l  Regulatory Agen- 
cies in Response to Bush Task Group (Apr. 4, 1983) ("Changes that increase competition 
among privately-owned providers of financial services and that reduce regulatory burdens 
that hinder the efficient provision of services will improve the financial system's ability to 
meet customer needs."). 
Of course, not all financial institutions share in this assessment of regulatory obsoles- 
cence. Smaller, community financial institutions, in particular, tend to favor a continuaticm 
of present regulatory patterns. The National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, for cxam- 
ple, has stated that "[oln the threshold question of whether fundamental change is needed, 
our delegates were nearly unanimous that no basic change is necessary at this time." Letter 
from Herbert W. Gray, Chairman of the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, to 
Bush Task Group (Mar. 14, 1983). 
4. Skinner, Report of the Southern Regional Banking Committee to the Executive Com- 
mittee of the Southern Growth Policies Board (1983)brepared for the Eighth Annual Meet- 
ing of the National Conference on Financial Services, Apr. 6-8, 1983), reprinted in BANKING 
EXPANSION REP., May 16, 1983, at 15. 
5. Recommendation of Association of Bank Holding Companies to Bush Task Group 
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Proxmire observed that "developments in the marketplace have out- 
paced the creaky regulatory structure that was established for financial 
institutions during the Civil War, the money panics of the turn of the 
century, and the Great Depre~sion."~ 
A. Where We Came From 
The shape of present financial institutions and their regulatory 
agencies is a consequence of the vicissitudes of past economic conditions, 
intermittent financial panics, and a constantly changing political cli- 
mate.' While changes in financial services regulation have not always 
occurred in logical or measured sequence, five basic themes-dual 
banking, multiple regulators, the separation of commercial from invest- 
ment banking, restrictions on interstate banking, and the "special" char- 
acter of commercial banks-consistently have pervaded debates about 
regulatory structure. 
1. Dual Banking @stem.-The early history of financial services regu- 
lation in the United States is, to a large degree, the history of bank regu- 
lation. Perhaps the single most significant theme of bank regulation has 
been the co-existence of state and federal regulators with sometimes 
overlapping jurisdictions. The development of a dual banking system, 
however, was not the result of any conscious program for shared power 
between national and state  regulator^.^ To  the contrary, it was a prod- 
uct of the tension between attempts by federal authorities to exert a 
measure of control over the banking system and the steadfast resistance 
to such control by state and regional interests. 
Such conflicts between parochial economic interests--federal vs. 
state, aristocratic vs. democratic, capitalist vs. agrarian, mercantile vs. 
laissez-faire-have been abundant since the' early days of the United 
States financial services industry, when the desirability and constitution- 
ality of establishing a Bank of the United States were vigorously debated 
political  issue^.^ The Jeffersonian party opposed the establishment of a 
(Mar. 1983) (attached to Letter from Donald L. Rogers, President of the Association of Bank 
Holding Companies, to Bush Task Group (Mar. 1 I, 1983)). 
6. 129 CONG. REC. S1515 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1983)(statement of Sen. Proxmire introduc- 
ing S. 559, the Federal Bank Commission Act of 1983). 
7. For an interesting general discussion of traumatic changes in the financial market- 
place, see C. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
CRISES (1978). 
8. Hackley, Our Baflng Banking Sy~tmr, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 570-7 1 (1966). 
9. See, e.g., R. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 164-85 (1902 
new impression 1960); P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 45, 65 (1963). 
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federal bank, arguing that the power to create a bank was not an enu- 
merated power of the federal government under the Constitution." Al- 
exander Hamilton argued that the federal government had an implied 
power to establish a bank that would facilitate the performance of gov- 
ernmental functions.'' The subsequent debate over Hamilton's propo- 
sal to establish a Bank of the United States focused on the proper roles 
of the federal and state  government^'^ and anticipated many of the is- 
sues which have since accompanied the development of the dual bank- 
ing system.13 
The debate over establishing a federal bank was temporarily 
mooted in 1791 when Congress granted a twenty-year charter to the first 
Bank of the United States.14 The record of the first Bank of the United 
States from 1791 to 181 1 was excellent,15 and the initial experiment was 
considered successful. Many individuals remained opposed to a federal 
bank, however, and when the charter expired in 181 1, congressional sup- 
port for its renewal was insufficient. The directors of the bank were 
politically inept,I6 and the vote to renew the charter was lost by a mar- 
gin of only one vote in each house." 
With the first Bank of the United States out of business, there was a 
rapid expansion of state-chartered banks" which were needed to help 
finance the War of 1812. The financial demands of that war, the spo- 
radic issuance of state bank notes that were not adequately backed by 
specie, and the war-related disruption of foreign tradeIg left the post-war 
national economy with intermittent price inflation and deflation, dis- 
rupted banking facilities, and a disordered currency.20 Moreover, due 
10. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, J U ~  note 9, at 60. 
- .  
11. Hamilton argued that a national bank would serve a number of important purposes. 
First, it would augment the active or productive capital of the country because ''[;]old and 
silver . . . when deposited in banks, to become the basis of a paper circulation . . . acquire 
. . . an active and productive quality." Second, it would provide "[glreater facility to the 
Government, in obtaining pecuniary aids, especially in sudden emergencies." Third, it would 
facilitate the payment of taxes through the availability of loans. A. Hamilton, Treasury Re- 
port on a National Bank (1790), repinfedin 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Finance Vol. 1, 67- 
68 (1832). 
12. E. REED, R. COTTER, E. GILL & R. SMITH, COMMERCIAL BANKING 18 (2d ed. 1980) 
[hereinafter cited as COMMERCIAL BANKING]. 
13. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supa note 9, at 60-61. 
14. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191. 
15. B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 
CIVIL WAR 209 (1957). 
16. Id. at 222. 
17. Id 
18. COMMERCIAL BANKING, mprn note 12, at 18. 
19. B. HAMMOND, m p a  note 15, at 227-29. 
20. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, * a  note 9, at 82. 
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to the largely uncontrolled proliferation of state banks, the varieties of 
"currency" from bank to bank and from state to state created confusion 
and uncertainty which generally impeded interstate commerce. 
In 1816, Congress responded to the need to restore order in the 
banking and currency system and to return to specie payments21 by 
granting a twenty-year charter for the second Bank of the United 
 state^.^' The second Bank of the United States was subject to much of 
the same opposition that had confronted its predecessor. In 181gZ3 and 
again in 1824,24 the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitu- 
tionality of a federal bank. Each time, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for 
the Court to uphold the Bank's cons t i t~ t iona l i t~ .~~  Even after thwart- 
ing constitutional attacks, however, and despite congressional support 
for its existence, the desirability of a federal bank remained a conten- 
tious political issue. After President Andrew Jackson in 1832 vetoed the 
legislation to renew its charter,26 the second Bank of the United States 
went out of existence in 1836." 
With the demise of the second Bank of the United States, and the 
absence of national banks during the ensuing twenty-seven years, state 
banking entered its second era of great State governments 
favored the formation of banks to stimulate industry and to provide 
sources of public finan~ing.~' In 1837, in Briscoe v. Bank of KentuckyY3O the 
Supreme Court confirmed that states had the right to charter banks, 
and upheld the authority of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to create, 
21. Id. at 83-84. 
22. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266; sccgrnmaI/v J. HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY O F  
MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at 145-51 (1973). 
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819). 
24. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326 (1824). 
25. In McCulIoch, the Court relied upon the necessary and proper clause and upon Con- 
gress's constitutionally conferred powers to declare war and raise revenue. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
at 162-63. In Osbom, the Court reviewed and affirmed McCufIoch, noting that the Bank "is an 
instrument which is 'necessary and proper' for carrying on the fiscal operations of govern- 
ment." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 379. 
26. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, mpra note 9, at 105; sccgcnrraI/u J. MCFAUL, THE POLI- 
TICS OF JACKSONIAN FINANCE (1972) (discussing the political climate in Washington and the 
banking industry during Andrew Jackson's presidency). 
27. &cgmeralb I1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-89 (D. Richardson ed. 
1897) (containing the text of President Andrew Jackson's veto message); R. C A ~ E R A L L ,  supIa 
note 9 (an engaging historical account of the second Bank from its establishment to its de- 
feat); B. HAMMOND, mpra note 15, at 144-450 (containing a detailed discussion of the two 
Banks of the United States); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND
THE MEN WHO MADE IT 56-63 (1948) (discussing the political factors leading to the demise 
of the second Bank of the United States). 
28. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note 9, at 107. 
29. fa'. 
30. 36 U.S. (I 1 Pet.) 256 (1837). 
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as its exclusive property, the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
with the authority to issue bank notes as ~ur rency .~ '  
In this environment, with the second Bank of the United States out 
of existence, the constitutionality of state-chartered banks confirmed, 
and the use of state banks on the riseY3* the concept of "free banking" 
became popular as a "proper solution to the difficult banking problems 
of the 1830 '~ . "~~  The business of banking was to be open to all market 
participants who wished to compete. Competition, not governmental 
intervention, would regulate the financial marketplace. 
Although a pure free banking system was never adopted in the 
United States, New York in 1838 enacted a Free Banking Act3* which 
- 
was copied by other states, and such state legislation contributed to the 
rapid expansion of state banking between 1836 and 1863. During these 
years of so-called "wildcat" banking there was no federal paper cur- 
rency, state laws were lax, and the banks created under them did little to 
inspire public ~ o n f i d e n c e . ~ ~  The growth of state banks was accompa- 
nied in too many instances by unsound banking practices and the exces- 
sive issuance of bank notes.36 Many of these state banks were owned 
and operated by entrepreneurs who had an eye for short-term profit but 
lacked an understanding of banking, economics, or finance.37 More- 
over, as the Civil War approached, the federal government found itself 
with no central bank to act as its fiscal agent.38 
Congress in 1863 responded to the banking situation by passing the 
National Currency Act ,39 which was enacted both to finance the Civil 
3 1. Id pmsim. 
The opinion in Bkcoc was tempered, however, by Justice Story's dissent. He cau- 
tioned that states could create banks and authorize them to issue bank notes as currency but 
"subject always to the control of Congress, whose powers extend to the entire regulation of the 
currency of the country." Id at 348 (Story, J., dissenting). 
32. Klebaner, State-ChartcredAmmcan CommcrciaIBanks /78/-/80/, 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 529 
(1979). 
33. F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS @t. 2) at 187 
(1951 & photo. reprint 1968). 
34. B. HAMMOND, supra note 15, at 583-84. 
35. See Hackley, nrpIa note 8, at 570; see generaI/v Hammond, Hismcal  Introduction, in 
BANKING STUDIES 9-10 (1941) (in some states banking was a prohibited activity at various 
times during the 1840's and 1850's). 
36. COMMERCIAL BANKING, supra note 12, at 19. 
37. See P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, mpra note 9, at 73-74. 
38. Id at 137. 
39. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. President Lincoln had recommended the 
establishment of a "uniform currency" to be provided by banking associations organized 
under a "general act" of the Congress. &c STAFF OF SENATE COMM. O N  BANKING AND CUR- 
RENCY, 8 8 ~ ~  CONC., 1sT SES~., FEDERAL BANKING LAWS AND REPORTS: A COMPILATION 
OF MAJOR FEDERAL BANKING DOCUMENTS 1780-1912, at 306 (Comm. Print 1963). 
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War effort by stimulating the sale of government securities4' and to pro- 
mote a uniform currency. The National Currency Act provided for the 
organization of national banks which would possess the authority to is- 
sue bank notes secured by government bonds. It also established a sepa- 
rate bureau within the Department of the Treasury, under a 
Comptroller of the Currency, which was given authority to approve the 
formation of national banks.41 Subsequently, the National Currency 
Act was replaced by legislation which has since become known as the 
National Bank Act of 1864 (National Bank Although it is often 
considered to be a fundamental component of the dual banking sys- 
the National Bank Act was intended, at least in part, to hasten 
the demise of state banking.44 
In 1865, in a further effort to reduce the number of state 
Congress passed a ten percent per annum tax on state bank notes.46 The 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the tax in 1869.47 The 
tax's impact upon state banks, however, was not as great as expected. In 
a classic market response to regulation, deposit banking and the use of 
checks as an alternative to bank notes became w i d e ~ p r e a d . ~ ~  Moreover, 
many banks still preferred to operate under state charters because state 
regulation was generally less restrictive than federal regulation. 
2 Competing Federal Regulatory Agencze3.-The interagency competi- 
tion and the potential for chaos inherent in the dual banking system 
have been compounded by the existence of multiple regulators at the 
federal level. In 1908, following the financial "panic" of 1907, a National 
Monetary Commission studied the need for revising mandatory reserve 
requirements for commercial banks as well as the need for a more elastic 
40. Hackley, supra note 8, at 570. 
41. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. 
42. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99. The legislation was entitled "An Act to 
Provide a ~ a t i o n a l  Currency, Secured by a Pledge of united States Bonds and to Provide for 
the Circulation and Redemption Thereof." For discussion on the codification of the provi- 
sions of the National Bank Act that have survived to the present, see Levin, In Search of fhe 
National Bank Act, 97 BANKING L.J. 741, 743, 750 11.26 (1980). 
43. At least one federal circuit court has exhibited this confusion. In Independent Bank- 
ers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 932 (D.C. Cir.), ctrf. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976), the 
circuit court observed that "[wlhen Congress established our dual banking system it wisely 
placed at one cornerstone the principle of competitive equality between state and national 
banks." 
44. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1139 (1865). 
45. Hackley, mpra note 8, at 573. 
46. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 5 6, 13 Stat. 469, 484. 
47. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869). 
48. See gcneralb J. HURST, supra note 22, at  50-53 (discussing the increased use of bank 
deposits and checks as a source of greater liquidity). 
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~urrency.~'  Initially, the National Monetary Commission favored estab- 
lishing a central banking in~titution,~' but there was little political sup- 
port for such an approach. Later, a compromise was reached which 
called for establishing eight to twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks 
that were to operate under the general supervision of the Board of Gov- 
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve B ~ a r d ) . ~ '  Mem- 
bership in the Federal Reserve System was mandatory for all nationally- 
chartered banks and elective for state-chartered banks. Members were 
required to buy stock in a regional reserve bank and submit to its regu- 
l a t i ~ n . ~ *  Consequently, all nationally-chartered banks were subject to 
regulation by both the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal 
Reserve Board. 
State banks were permitted to join the Federal Reserve System 
while still retaining their state charters as long as they met minimum 
capital and reserve  requirement^.^^ Membership brought with it regula- 
tion by the Federal Reserve System as well as by the state regulator. 
Alternatively, state banks could choose to forego the benefits of member- 
ship and remain free of federal supervision altogether. 
The next significant step in the evolution of overlapping state and 
federal jurisdiction was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC),54 the third major component of the federal regula- 
tory structure. Under the terms of the Vandenberg Amendment to the 
Banking Act of 1933,55 all banks that were members of the Federal Re- 
serve System were required to have their deposits insured by the FDIC; 
non-member banks could receive insurance coverage upon application 
to and approval by the FDIC. The 1933 legislation was temporary, but 
the federal deposit insurance system was adopted permanently in 
1935.56 As Friedman and Schwartz have observed, the Banking Act of 
1933 "neither abolished nor reduced the powers of any existing govern- 
ment body concerned with banking."57 Rather, "it simply superim- 
posed an additional agency, the FDIC, whose functions both 
49. Hackley, supra note 8, at 573. 
50. P. STUDENSK~ & H. KROOSS, supra note 9, at 254-55. 
51. J. HURST, supra note 23, at 206. 
52. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 5 2, 38 Stat. 251, 252 (1913); see also Hackley, supra note 8, 
at 574. 
53. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, CHANGES IN THE BANKING AND CUR- 
RENCY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 69, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1913). 
54. The FDIC was created by the Vandenburg Amendment to the Banking Act of 1933, 
ch. 89, 5 8, 48 Stat. 168 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. $5 181 1-1832 (1982)). 
55. Id 
56. M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
1867- 1960, at 434-35 (1963). 
57. Id at 435. 
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supplemented and duplicated those of existing agen~ies."~' Moreover, 
the federal deposit insurance system provided an incentive for state- 
chartered non-member banks to submit to the federal regulatory control 
of the FDIC. By the end of 1982 the FDIC had become the primary 
regulator for 8833 state-chartered non-member banks5' 
In the 193OYs, the power of the Federal Reserve System grew, ex- 
tending to administration of the restrictions governing securities activi- 
ties by banks, to enforcement of deposit interest rate controls, and in 
1956, to the regulation of bank holding companies. Congress, in the 
193OYs, also began to expand federal control of other segments of the 
financial services industry. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) was created in 1934 to regulate activities traditionally associated 
with investment banking and securities br~kerage.~' The Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was established in 1932 to supervise the sav- 
ings and loan industry and facilitate home mortgage f inan~ing.~ '  More 
recently, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) was estab- 
lished in 19706* and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) was established in 1974.63 Even in the area of insurance, an 
industry for the most part regulated at the state Congress in 1974 
extended federal regulation to insured pension plans through the Em- 
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the creation of 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).65 
3 The S'aralion of Commercial Banking jam Certain Securities Actlvi- 
tics.-The banking system that developed in the United States in the 
nineteenth century was based upon the British tradition of separation of 
commercial and investment banking functions and was influenced by 
58. Id. 
59. FEDERAL DEPOSIT NSURANCE CORPORATION, 1982 STATISTICS ON BANKING 6 (sta- 
tistics provided as of December 3 1, 1982). 
60. The SEC was established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, $4 ,  48 
Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. $ 78(d) (1982)). 
61. The FHLBB was established by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 
47 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 1421-1449 (1982)); see gmcmlb T. MAR- 
VELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD (1969). 
62. The NCUA was established in 1970. Act of Mar. 10, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-206, 84 
Stat. 49 (1970). 
63. The C l T C  was established in 1974 by the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 93- 
463,88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 7 U.S.C. (1982)). 
64. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. $5 101 1- 1015 (1982); SEC v. Variable Annuity 
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65,68-69 (1959). Bul t$ United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 
322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944) (the interstate activities of insurance enterprises are subject to 
Congress' control under the commerce clause). 
65. The PBGC was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. IV, $ 4002,88 Stat. 829, 1004 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1302 (1982)). 
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the belief that public deposits should not be committed to investment 
banking, which was considered to be inherently speculative and risky.66 
Section 8 of the National Bank Act expressed this philosophy by not 
including investment banking among the enumerated powers of na- 
tional banks.67 
At least in part because of competitive pressures from state banks 
during the 1860's and 1870's, however, courts initially adopted a permis- 
sive interpretation of the National Bank Act. For example, the phrase 
"by discounting and negotiating promissory notes" was interpreted to 
include an implied power of national banks to invest in state, municipal, 
and corporate bonds.68 The limits of judicial permissiveness were not 
defined clearly until Fir& National Bank of Charlotte u. National Exchange 
Bank ~fBaltrinore,~~ in which the Supreme Court stated that the prohibi- 
tion on stock trading contained in the National Bank Act prevented na- 
tional banks from investing in corporate securities and stock for profit.70 
In contrast, state-chartered banks and trust companies were generally 
permitted to engage in investment banking activities. Trust companies, 
in particular, enjoyed rather broad securities powers under state 
 charter^.^' 
Other securities activities of national banks were similarly curtailed 
in the early twentieth century. In 1902, the Comptroller of the Currency 
concluded that the National Bank Act did not permit national banks to 
participate in the underwriting and distribution of equity ~ecur i t ies .~~ 
66. Perkins, The Diuorce of Commercial and Znuestmenf Banking: A Aisfoty, 88 BANKING L.J. 
484,485 (1971). For a comprehensive discussion of historical and current issues in the area of 
separation of commercial banking from investment banking, see generally H. Pitt & J. Wil- 
liams, The Evolving Financial Services Industry: Statutory and Regulatory Framework and 
Current Issues in the Banking Securities Arena (outline prepared for the American Bar Asso- 
ciation National Institute on Financial Institutions: An Assessment of the New Products, 
Structure, Marketing and Regulation, Boston, Massachusetts, Apr. 27-28, 1983). 
67. The National Bank Act of 1864 included the following list of powers for national 
banks: 
[All1 such incidental powen as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking 
by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other 
evidence of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and 
- - 
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; [and] by obtaining, issuing, and 
circulating notes according to the provisions of this act. 
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 5 88, 13 Stat. 99, 101. 
68. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bennington, 9 F. Cas. 97 (C.C.D. Vt. 1879) (No. 4807) 
(interpreting the clause in the National Bank Act, "by discounting and negotiating promis- 
sory notes," to include investing in municipal bonds); Newport ~ a t ' l  Bank ~ o a r d  bf Educ., 
114 Ky. 87, 70 S.W. 186 (1902) (same). 
69. 92 U.S. 122 (1875). 
70. Id. at 128. 
7 1. Perkins, mpra note 66, at 487. 
72. Be, e.g., F. REDLICH, mpra note 33, at 393. 
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Prodded by the need to compete with full service state banks, a number 
of major national banks responded to the comptroller's ruling by treat- 
ing nonbank securities affiliates chartered under state law. These affili- 
ates were free from federal regulation and were able to engage in the 
underwriting of corporate ~ecur i t i e s .~~  In 1912, Congress established the 
Pujo Committee to investigate the involvement of commercial banks in 
investment banking a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~  The report of the Pujo Committee con- 
cluded that it was illegal for national banks to purchase and sell equity 
securities, and expressed "grave doubt [about] the power of national 
banks to buy and sell bonds."75 
The outbreak of World War I, however, provided an opportunity 
for expanded national bank involvement in the distribution of securities. 
Many of the Liberty Bonds76 issued by the federal government were sold 
through national banks. As a result, national banks developed efficient 
systems for distributing securities and enjoyed the benefits of investor 
confidence because Liberty Bonds were of unquestioned soundness.77 At 
the end of World War I, the marketing systems that had so successfully 
distributed Liberty Bonds went searching for new products to sell. 
Meanwhile, state banks were expanding their investment banking 
activities and the dual banking system exerted increased pressure on fed- 
eral regulators. Because the federal government wished to encourage 
state banks and trust companies to enter the Federal Reserve System, 
these state-chartered institutions were allowed to become member banks 
without giving up the investment banking privileges granted to them by 
state law.78 Competitive pressures then forced the Comptroller of the 
Currency to permit national banks to engage in modified securities ac- 
tivities7' The Comptroller of the Currency's Annual Report of 1924 
recommended legislation permitting national banks to buy and sell se- 
73. Scc id; see aho H. W I L L I ~  & J. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION 186-87 (1934) 
(describing the various securities activities of typical securities affiliates). 
74. The Pujo Committee was a subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency authorized by Congress in H.R. Res. 429, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912), to investigate 
the monetary and banking conditions in the United States with a view toward remedial legis- 
lation. The recommendations of the Pujo Committee are contained in REPORT OF THE 
COMM. APPOINTED PURSUANT O HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE 
CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 1593,62d Cong., 3d 
Sess. 162 (1913). 
75. H.R. REP. NO. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 152. 
76. Liberty Bonds were issued by the United States in 191 7, 1918, and 1919 to finance the 
participation of the United States in World War I and to fund loans to the Allied Powers. G. 
MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 558 (F. Garcia 8th ed. rev. 1983). 
77. W. PEACH, THE SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS 31-33 (1941). 
78. SccC. T I P P E ~ S ,  TATE BANKS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 109-12 (1929). 
79. W. PEACH, supra note 77, at 150. 
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curities through affiliates." Throughout the 1920's there was an enor- 
mous expansion in bank underwriting of corporate debt securities, and 
by the end of that decade the bank share of that market exceeded sixty 
percent ." 
The presumed existing power of national banks to underwrite in- 
vestment securities through affiliates was confirmed by the Pepper-Mc- 
Fadden Act (McFadden Act) in 1927.82 The provisions of the 
McFadden Act that purported to ratify the securities activities of banks 
were not without opposition, however. Senator Carter Glass was promi- 
nent among those who contended that the proper role of banks was not 
to underwrite securities but was rather to allocate capital to productive 
uses and enterprises through commercial loans.83 The collapse of the 
stock market in 1929, in part attributable to the startling incompetence 
of the Federal Reserve Board in not acting to curb speculative activity 
by commercial banks:* further convinced Senator Glass and others that 
the separation of commercial and investment banking was fundamental 
to the integrity of the national banking system.85 
As a result of the efforts of Senator Glass and Congressman Henry 
Steagall, among others, Congress in 1933 adopted the Glass-Steagall 
which drew a wavy line between commercial banking and certain 
forms of investment banking. National banks were barred from under- 
writing and dealing in all securities except treasury securities and state 
and local general obligation bonds:' but retained their authority to in- 
vest in "investment grade" corporate bonds and state and local revenue 
80. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1924). 
81. Perkins, supra note 66, at 495, 527. 
82. Ch. 191, 5 2@), 44 Stat. 1224, 1227 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378 
(1982)). 
83. S e  Brokers' Loam: Hearzngs on J: Rcs. f //3 Before the Sennit Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928). 
84. J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 32-47 (1961). 
85. See H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra note 73, at 67-71 (discussing some of the consider- 
ations which led the Senate Banking Committee, under Chairman Glass, to advocate the 
separation of commercial and investment banking); Perkins, supra note 66, at 499 (quoting 
excerpt from Letter of Sm. Curler Class, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2 1, 1929) ("As a purely business 
proposition I would like to see excessive marginal speculation [by banks] abated. . . . My 
concern has been for the economic integrity of the Federal Reserve banking system."). Set 
general& S. Friedman & C. Barber, Financial Markets in 1920-1933 (1981) (outline prepared 
for the Ninth Annual University of California, San Diego, Securities Regulation Institute) 
(summarizing the factors considered by legislators prior to the enactment of the Glass-Stea- 
gall Act in 1933, including the efficacy of securities affiliates of commercial banks). 
86. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)). 
87. Id 5 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 5 24 (1982)). 
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bonds.88 Moreover, while the Act permitted banks to offer brokerage 
services, it did so in an obscure way;89 its method of dealing with securi- 
ties affiliates was pregnant with loopholes, many of which have only 
recently been e~ploited.~" 
4. Restrictionr on Interdate Bank2ng.-Commercial banking enterprises 
are unique among major American businesses in that, historically, they 
have not been permitted to engage in business in more than one state.g1 
The foundation of this state-by-state banking system is the legal author- 
ity of each state to prohibit out-of-state institutions from operating 
branch banks within its territory.92 Moreover, at the federal level, na- 
tional banks and state member banks have been barred from interstate 
branching since the passage of the McFadden Act in 1927.93 
The McFadden Act dealt with branch banking, but did not address 
the issue of bank holding companies owning separate banks in more 
than one state. The issue finally was addressed by the Douglas Amend- 
mentg4 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.95 Under the Doug- 
las Amendment, states are presumed to want to exclude from their 
banking industries not only branches of out-of-state banks, but also in- 
state banks owned by any bank holding company that controls a state or 
national bank in another state.96 Time, however, has not been kind to 
restrictions on interstate banking activity. During the past decade, 
many of the nation's largest banks have made successful efforts to estab- 
lish an extensive interstate presence notwithstanding current prohibi- 
tions on interstate banking." 
88. See general& Rogowski, Commercial Banks and Munic+l Reuenue B o d ,  95 BANKING L.J. 
155 (1978). 
89. Pitt & Williams, The Gh-St tagal l  Act: Kcy Iszucs to the Financial Sbvtces Induflry, 1 1  
SEC. REG. L.J. 234, 237 (1983). 
90. See, e.g., OCC Approves National Bank Charter for Tmst Company Owned ly Mutual Fund 
Adviser and Broker, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) fl 99,463 (Feb. 
2, 1983). 
91. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1137 & n.1 (1981). 
92. See id at 1152-59. 
93. Ch. 191, 5 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 5 36 
(1982)). 
94. 12 U.S.C. 5 1842(d) (1982). 
95. Id: 55 1841-1850. 
96. Ginsberg, supra note 91, at 1167. 
97. See Brouillette, Interstate Bankrnfi Om Thnp's Expm'mce, Am. Banker, Apr. 4, 1984, at 
1; Carrington, Financial Fracas. Some Bankers Step Up Driue to Win the Rzght to Enter New Fielak, 
Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (discussing the efforts of banks to overcome restrictive 
regulation and enter new industries such as real estate, securities, underwriting, and insur- 
ance); Fraust, Banks Stake Out an Interstate Future, Am. Banker, Apr. 2, 1984, at 1 [hereinafter 
cited as Fraust, Banks Stake Out an Interskate Future]; Fraust, Crossing State Liner How Some Banks 
DidIt ,  Am. Banker, Apr. 3, 1984, at 1, 9 [hereinafter cited as Fraust, Crossing State Lines]; cf: 
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5. Banks as rSpe~ial"Inrtitutionr.-The final distinguishing character- 
istic of the evolution of financial institutions has been the special role 
accorded to banks. Over time, there has been a progressivelydeepening 
commitment by the federal government to the safety and soundness of 
the banking system. The creation of the FDIC?' the role of the Federal 
Reserve Board as the lender of last resort?' and the conviction in the 
marketplace that federal financial regulators would never permit a ma- 
jor bank to "go under"loO are evidence of that commitment. Changes in 
the financial markets, however, have made it increasingly more difficult 
to decide which institutions are  bank^."'^' 
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1963, Justice Brennan in United 
States v. P'ilade@hia National Banklo2 noted the distinctive ability of banks 
to accept demand deposits as well as the unique role of banks in provid- 
ing business credit.lo3 In agreeing that the "cluster of products . . . and 
services . . . denoted by the term 'commercial banking' . . . [composed] 
a distinct line of commerce," the Supreme Court stated that "[slome 
commercial banking products or services [such as the checking account] 
are so distinctive that they are entirely free of effective competition from 
products or services of other financial  institution^."^^^ Since the Phila- 
deCphia National Bank decision, however, the term "deposit" has been 
more and more broadly construed and courts have determined that it no 
McMurray, Financial Fracas: Banks and RiuaLr AIS~ Into New Businesses as Congrt.r.r Dawdh, Wall 
St. J . ,  Mar. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 6. 
98. See sups note 54. 
99. "Under the over-all supervision of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Banks 
perform many varied functions for the banking community. Through the operation of its 
'discount window,' a Reserve Bank may lend funds to member banks, and . . . other deposi- 
tory institutions." HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 9 8 ~ ~  
CONG., ST SESS., FORMATION AND POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONSA LE- 
GAL PRIMER 1-36 (Comm. Print 1983) (prepared by Natter) (citing 12 U.S.C. 5 461 (1982)). 
The Board of Governors has the statutory authority to "authorize any Federal reserve bank 
. . . to discount [eligible collateral] for any individual, partnership, or corporation." 12 
U.S.C. 5 343 (1982). 
100. See gmeralb Warning Ltghtsfir Bank Soundness.. Special Isme on Commercial Bank Surveil- 
lance, ECON. REV., Nov. 1983 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). 
101. Some commentators still adhere to the view that banks are special and that banking 
and nonbanking activities are readily distinguishable for regulatory purposes. Gerald E. Cor- 
rigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, for example, has argued that 
there are three unique characteristics of banks: "1. Banks offer transaction accounts; 2. Banks 
are the back-up source of liquidity for all other institutions; 3. Banks are the transmission belt 
for monetary policy." Corrigan further observes that "[ilt is clear that these essential charac- 
teristics are highly complementary and furthermore that it is the relationship among them 
that best captures the essence of what makes banks special." Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapo- 
lis, Arc Banks SpecialZ, in ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1982). 
102. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
103. Id. at 326-27. 
104. Id. at 356. 
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longer provides a clear line of division between banks and "nonbank 
banks."lo5 
B. Where We Are Today 
Economic events and the shifting demands for more and different 
- 
financial services have prompted innovation among the various sectors 
of the financial services industry. Innovation and adaptation have in 
turn encouraged cross-industry competition which has threatened the 
integrity of a regulatory structure initially based on the premise that 
each type of financial institution had distinct functions, operated in a 
distinct sector of the capital markets, and could best be served by a sepa- 
rate regulator. The validity of that premise was evanescent, and the 
structure which rested upon it has crumbled with the erosion of the 
foundation. '06 
105. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 938-42 (D.C. Cir.), 
cerf. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) (interpreting "deposits" as including those types of transac- 
tions conducted at an "electronic teller": (1) ordinary deposits into a checking or savings 
account; (2) transfers of funds between two accounts; and (3) payments on installment loans 
or credit card accounts). 
T h e  term "nonbank bank" has been defined as: 
a n  organization that evades the Bank Holding Company Act's two-pronged defini- 
tion of a bank as an institution that both accepts demand deposits and  makes com- 
mercial loans. By stripping a bank of one of those activities, a company owning 
such a n  institution may avoid the [Bank Holding Company] Act's prohibitions 
against nonbanking organizations controlling banks and against interstate banking, 
and  avoid regulation by the Federal Reserve Board, which administers the [Bank 
Holding Company] Act. 
/BAA Assai/s OCC's Nonbank Po/icies in Lrffcr to Reagan, Others, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 
11, at 442 (Mar. 12, 1984); see alsoJurt When 1s a Bank Nof a Bank.> Whm If 1s An Abomination, 
Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1984, a t  1, col. 4 ("What makes a bank nonbank is that i t  has been 
slightly reorganized [by eliminating either its deposit taking or commercial lending activities] 
by a nonbanking corporate owner to avoid Federal Reserve Board regulation."). 
T h e  Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency have disagreed vig- 
orously over the comptroller's willingness to approve nonbank banks. See, c.g., Compfro//n 
Expresses D i m y  Oucr Pmncy EndRun AroundMoratorim, Am. Banker, Apr. 29, 1983, at  1. Sig- 
nificant opposition to nonbank bank expansion has also been voiced by representatives of the 
securities and  mutual funds industries. They are particularly wary of regulatory actions and 
legislative changes which would permit nonbank banks to enter the investment banking in- 
dustry without granting investment bankers reciprocal access to compete in commercial 
banking activities. Testifying before the Senate Banking Committee on March 7, 1984, 
David Silver, President of the Investment Company Institute, recommended that the Glass- 
Steagall Act be restored to its "pristine purity" and said that "nonbank banks are being 
established not because of a weakness in Glass-Steagall but because regulators are acting like 
'non-cop cops' by failing to enforce the banking laws." Securities Znuedmmf Companies Opposdto 
Ciuing B a k  New Powers, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at  431, 433 (1984). 
106. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Committee on Developments in Investment Services, Homogmizahon 
of Financia/ Zmtitufiom: The Lr~isIatiut and Replatoy Response, 38 BUS. LAW. 24 1 ( 1982); Clark, 
The Soundness o/ Financia/ Znfmnrdarics, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976); Wallison, Bonking Rep/atoy 
System Badly in Need o/ R c / m ,  Legal Times, June 27, 1983, at  27. 
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Traditionally, financial institutions have been treated as either in- 
vestment institutions, insurance institutions, or depository institutions, 
on the assumption that each type of institution performed readily iden- 
tifiable and separable  function^.'^' In recent years, however, product 
lines have been blurred, institutional characterization has become less 
significant, and federal regulators have attempted to keep pace with an 
expanding "financial services indu~try."'~' Brokers and financial con- 
glomerates have offered money market mutual funds and attracted bil- 
lions of dollars in deposits from investors looking for higher interest rates 
than those banks could offer under federal law.lo9 Banks provide dis- 
count brokerage ser~ices ,"~ operate as futures commission merchants," ' 
and have attempted to enter the insurance business.'12 Savings and 
107. See, rg., Wallison, nrpra note 106, at 27. 
108. see general^ Carrington, supra note 97; McMurray, s u p  note 97; The Brave New World, 
mpra note 1; Fimncial Morass. Deregulation of Banks Sfirs C o n ~ o n ,  Splits Fed and White House, 
Wall St. J., July 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6. 
109. The lifting of interest rate restrictions under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation 
Q, 12 C.F.R. 217.0 (1983), has, of course, shifted some of these funds away from money 
market mutual funds and into money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) and other deposit 
accounts offered by banks. Federal Reserve Board statistics for June 1983 indicate a total of 
$367.3 billion held in MMDAs and $178.5 billion held in money market mutual funds. Money 
Stock Measures and Components, 69 FED. RESERVE BULL. 15 (1983). In June 1982, $202.3 billion 
was held in money market mutual funds. Money Stock Measures and Components, 68 FED. RE- 
SERVE BULL. 13 (1983). The Depository Institutions Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982), 
authorized a phase out of the ceilings on the maximum rates of interest and dividends that 
could be paid on deposits. Subsequently, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 5 327, 96 Stat. 1469, 1501 (codified in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C. & 15 U.S.C. (1982)), directed the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee to 
establish regulations for the new MMDAs. These regulations are set forth at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1204.122 (1983). 
. 110. 4 e ,  rg . ,  Release and Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency, [1982-1983 Trans- 
fer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 199,284 (Aug. 26, 1982) (approving an application 
from Security Pacific National Bank to offer discount brokerage services through its new sub- 
sidiary, Security Pacific Discount Brokerage Services, Inc.). 
Some banks have entered the discount brokerage business by offering in-house broker- 
age services directly to their customers. See Bisky, How Are Banks Doing as Dtscount Brokers.?, 
A.B.A. BANKING J., Sept. 1983, at 43. Other banks have teamed up with independent broker- 
age firms. See OCC Approves Discount Brokerage Acquisition, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Oct. 4, 
1982, at 4. 
11 1. See, e.g., Wallison, *a note 106 ("in April 1982 the Comptroller gave preliminary 
approval to an application by North Carolina National Bank to establish a futures commis- 
sion merchant subsidiary, which would broker financial futures purchased or sold for hedging 
by commercial clients"); Nom~cst Bank Setting Up Fimncial Futures Trading Diuision in Chicago, 
Am. Banker, June 13, 1983, at 3 (in June 1983, Norwest Bank of Minneapolis set up a finan- 
cial futures division based in Chicago). 
112. South Dakota Senate Bill No. 256, signed by the Governor of South Dakota on 
March 4, 1983, and entitled "An act to revise the provisions for ownership, powers, operation 
and taxation of certain banks and their subsidiaries and to declare an emergency" permitted 
out-of-state banks and bank holding companies to enter the insurance business in South Da- 
kota. 1983 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 346, 5 39 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 3 51-18-30 
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loan associations and banks are used as retail outlets for sales of insur- 
ance contracts underwritten by independent  insurer^."^ Insurance 
companies have offered variable annuities and variable life insurance 
contracts having securities attributes as well as insurance  attribute^."^ 
Financial products and institutions that cross traditional industry lines 
have become commonplace. 
1. Cross-Zndwtly Products.-(a) The Central Asset Management Account.- 
The central asset management account combines features traditionally 
found in checking accounts, money market funds, and brokerage ac- 
counts.'15 It also presents a clear example of the problems associated 
with devising an effective regulatory scheme for cross-industry products. 
As long as jurisdiction is limited by notions of institutional type, it will 
be difficult to devise an effective regulatory plan for products like the 
(Supp. 1983)). Citicorp described its plans to enter the insurance business in an application 
dated May 13, 1983, to acquire American State Bank of Rapid City, South Dakota. As de- 
scribed in its application to the Federal Reserve Board, Citicorp intended to offer life insur- 
ance products, property and casualty insurance, accident and health insurance, and mortgage 
guaranty insurance, and its insurance activities concerning these products would include un- 
derwriting, marketing, and sales. Citicmp's I~lrrance P k ,  BANKING EXPANSION REP., July 
18, 1983, at 5. 
113. Savings and loan service corporations may provide insurance brokerage or agency 
services for liability, casualty, automobile, life, health, accident, or title insurance, but may 
not provide private mortgage insurance. 12 C.F.R. $ 545.74(c)(5)(ii) (1984). 
114. Set, e.g., Dorsett, Uniuersaf L f c  Emqes/Fom "lfoducl Reuofution," 122 TR.  & EST., July 
1983, at 22. 
1 15. See, e.g., Aduertismmt for Dean Wifter's Actiue As& Account, Wall St. J., July 20, 1983, at 
49, col. 1; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Prospectus for Cash Management 
Account", dated Sept. 14, 1983. 
As advertised, features of Dean Witter's Active Assets Account included the following: 
1. Check writing privileges--no minimum balance, no monthly fee, no per check 
service charge, no limit on amount of checks or on how many customer can use. 
2. Automatic sweep into money market fund. 
3. Charge card privileges. 
4. Check cashing after hours. 
5. Securities in brokerage account insured for up to $25 million. 
Wall St. J., July 20, 1983, at 49, col. 1. 
The prospectus for the Cash Management Account" program (CMA") of Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. states that the CMA' offers integrated financial services 
by linking together three components. Generally, those components are as follows: 
1. Securities Account-A conventional Merrill Lynch securities margin account. 
2. Money Account-Three no-load money funds investing in short-term securities 
(CMA" Monq  Fund, CMA" Coumunmt Secuniies Fund, and CMA" Tar-Exempt 
Fun4 .  
3. Visa Account-A Visa check/card account maintained by Bank One of Colum- 
bus, N.A., Columbus, Ohio. 
Free credit balances held in the Securities Account of persons subscribing to CMA" 
services are automatically invested in shares of one of three Money Funds or deposited with a 
depository institution, whichever is designated by the participant as the primary account. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra. 
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central asset management account. For example, the SEC regulates 
mutual funds and sales of securities and the bank regulatory agencies 
regulate intermediaries that accept deposits and offer transaction ac- 
counts. In the case of the central asset management account, although 
there is a bank in the picture, that bank holds no funds. It performs 
operations functions and runs a zero balance checking account. The 
real "deposit" is in the money market fund or, on a more transitional 
basis, in the free credit balance held a t  the brokerage firm. 
(6) Variable Imrance Contracts.-Traditionally, the activities of the in- 
surance industry have been regulated at the state level. Insurance prod- 
ucts such as variable annuity contracts, however, have incorporated 
features not traditionally associated with insurance. The variable annu- 
ity was developed as an alternative to fixed dollar annuities which did 
not reflect inflationary declines in the purchasing power of the dollar. 
When the Supreme Court determined that variable annuity contracts 
were se~ur i t i e s ,~ '~  they became subject to regulation by the SEC in addi- 
tion to regulation by insurance and securities commissioners at the state 
level. Thereafter, insurance company separate accounts were made to 
fit the mold of investment company regulation under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act).'" Subsequently, 
however, even when new products, such as variable life insurance, have 
116. In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (the VALICcase), the 
Court held that the variable annuity contract in question was a security outside the exemp- 
tion provided by 5 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 5 77c(a)(8) (1982). The 
provision exempts "any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annu- 
ity contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, 
bank commissioner, or any agency . . . of any State . . . or the District of Columbia." Id. 
The Court analyzed both the mortality risk and the investment risk of the variable annuity 
contract in question: 
In some respects the variable annuity has the characteristics of the fixed and con- 
ventional annuity: payments are made periodically; they continue until the annui- 
tant's death or in case other options are chosen until the end of a fixed term or until 
the death of the last of two oersons . . . . Each issuer assumes the risk of mortalitv 
from the moment the contract is issued . . . . It is this feature. . . that respondents 
stress when they urge that this is basically an insurance device. 
The difficulty is that, absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable 
annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company. The 
holder gets only a pro rala share of what the portfolio of equity interests reflects- 
which may be a lot, a little, or nothing. 
359 U.S. at 70-71. 
The Court concluded that. in the case of the variable annuitv contract before it. 
" [tlhere is no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance as it has coinmonly 
bein conceived of in popular understanding and usage." Id. at 73. 
117. 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-3(c)(3) (1982). 
Insurance companies are exempt from the Investment Company Act if they are "or- 
ganized as an insurance company, whose primary and predominant business activity is the 
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been structured to avoid the same regulatory fate as the variable annu- 
ity, the SEC has asserted jurisdiction, creating further questions about 
the reach of the Investment Company Act. ' l8 
2. Cross-Indmt~y Iivtitutzonr.40-called near-banks illustrate the 
structural and organizational changes that are making traditional dis- 
tinctions among institutional types untenable. "Near-banks" are finan- 
cial conglomerates, sometimes called "financial supermarkets," that 
offer a complete range of financial services to their customers. They 
often include "nonbank banks,"'lg which carry on many traditional 
banking functions but avoid many of the prohibitions on securities and 
interstate activities by escaping the classification of a "bank" under sec- 
tion 1841(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act120 or under other stat- 
utes which define "bank" by reference to the Bank Holding Company 
Act definition. The result is a single enterprise, one part of which may 
be supervised by one or more bank regulators, another part by state 
insurance regulators, another part by the SEC, and yet another part by 
the CFTC, without comprehensive regulatory oversight. 
A number of significant and highly visible national and regional 
corporations have entered the financial services industry and tested the 
writing of insurance . . . and which is subject to supervision by the insurance commissioner 
. . . of a State . . . ." /a! 5 80a-2(a)(17). In the YALICcase, the Court observed that: 
While the term "security" as defined in the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 5 77@)(1)] is 
broad enough to include any "annuity" contract, and the term "investment com- 
pany" as defined in the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 5 80a-31 would em- 
brace an "insurance company," the scheme of the exceptions lifts pro fanto the 
requirements of those two Federal Acts to the extent that [entities] are actually regu- 
lated by the States as insurance companies, ~yindced they arc such. 
359 U.S. a t  67-68 (emphasis in original). See also G. Hughes, The  Insurance Industry: Prod- 
ucts, Distribution Channels and the Challenge of Integrating Financial Services (outline pre- 
pared for Sixty-Fourth American Assembly, Apr. 7-10, 1983, Arden House, Harriman, New 
York, T h e  Future of American Financial Services Institutions). 
118. See, ~ ~ 5 , 4 9 8  SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) G-1 (Apr. 11, 1979). The  text accompany- 
ing footnote 20 of the release notes that "whether a company which issues a variety of con- 
tracts, some of which qualify as 'insurance' or 'annuities' and, thus, are exempt under section 
3(a)(8) of the Act, would be an investment company is a question of fact. A company's status 
will depend, in the final analysis, upon its total mix of business and the relationship of its 
securities business to its conventional insurance business." Id. n.20. 
119. See supra note 105. 
120. 12 U.S.C. 5 1841(c) (1982). Section 1841(c) states that: 
"[blank" means any institution organized under the laws of the United States, any 
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United 
States . . . except an institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or a n  institution chartered by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal 
right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commer- 
cial loans. 
Sre aLroJusi When h a Bank Not a Bonk' Whm li Is an Abomihution, supIo note 105. 
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limits of the current regulatory structure. Merrill Lynch offers a com- 
plete line of financial services.121 Sears, Roebuck has expanded beyond 
its traditional retail sales business into insurance, real estate, investment 
banking, and stock brokerage.lZ2 Shearson/American Express is in- 
volved in international banking.lZ3 Prudential is established in both the 
insurance and securities industries and, in addition, has established a 
nonbank bank.124 Many of these firms, even a few years ago, would not 
have considered each other competitors. 
As a result of these developments, interstate banking exists in all 
but legal form. The definition of the kind of financial institution that is 
"special" enough to be called a "bank" continues to be elusive, and the 
multiplicity of financial marketplace regulators has become a 
nightmare. 
3. Overlapping Regulatory J urisd2'ctionr.-The inefficiency of the current 
system of multiple regulators at the state and local levels has been ex- 
haustively ~ a t a l o g u e d ' ~ ~  and continues to increase. To  a significant ex- 
tent, this inefficiency is a result of the current system's proclivity for 
treating similar products differently by regulating along institutional 
rather than functional lines. For example, deposit-like services with 
transaction capability offered by money market funds are regulated as 
investment products under the Investment Company Act, and are there- 
fore subject to rules which differ sharply from those applicable to banks 
regarding advertising,126 interstate  operation^,'^' association with cer- 
tain types of business affiliates,12' and reserve requirements.12' If bank 
12 1. See Gart, The Financial Conglomerates, ECON. REV., May 1983, at 2 1. (published by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). See general& McMurray, mfla note 97. 
122. A. CART, THE INS~DER'S GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 42-47 
(1984). 
123. See Gart, supra note 121, at 22. 
124. Wallison, mpra note 106. 
125. Set, 6 . 8 ,  HOUSE COMM. O N  BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 9 4 ~ ~  CONG., 1ST 
SESS., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY (FINE): DISCUSS~ON PRINCI- 
PLES 11-14 (Comm. Print Nov. 1975). 
126. 17 C.F.R. 5 230.482 (1983). Both the Securities Act and the Investment Company 
Act require extensive disclosure of pertinent information in advertisements to prospective in- 
vestors in money market funds. 
127. Unlike member banks of the Federal Reserve System, which are subject to the 
McFadden Act, money market funds are not prohibited from engaging in interstate opera- 
tions, subject to disclosure requirements. 
128. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 5 17, 54 Stat. 789, 815-17 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-17 (1982)). 
129. A difference in treatment exists with respect to the check redemption features of 
money market funds and banks. While reserve requirements are imposed on transaction ac- 
counts offered by "depository institutions," 12 U.S.C. 5 461@) (1982), money market funds 
are not viewed as depository institutions. Therefore, although the check redemption features 
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brokerage activities are conducted by a bank holding company subsidi- 
ary, they are regulated by the SEC;130 if they are conducted by the bank 
itself, they are exempt from SEC regulation and are regulated by the 
bank regulators.131 Moreover, investment management activities by 
banks, even if carried on pursuant to straightforward investment man- 
agement agreements rather than trust arrangements, are exempt from 
the Investment Advisers Act,13' and are regulated by the bank regula- 
tors. Identical arrangements by nonbanks are subject to the provisions 
of the Investment Advisers Act. 
An even more dramatic example of inconsistency is the disparate 
treatment of commingled pension fund assets managed by banks and by 
independent investment managers.133 It is generally accepted that the 
efficient management of pension funds requires that the assets of more 
than one fund be managed on a commingled basis. If that commingling 
is done by an independent investment manager rather than by the trust 
department of a bank, the result is an investment company subject to 
registration and regulation under the Investment Company In- 
vestment companies are subject to the advertising controls set forth in 
the Securities Act, 135 the Securities Exchange and the rules and 
regulations promulgated thereunder by the SEC.13' They are also sub- 
of money market fund sponsored transaction accounts operate in a manner similar to transac- 
tion accounts offered by depository institutions, the Federal Reserve Board cannot impose 
reserve requirements on the money market funds under existing law. 
130. When banks and bank holding companies employ subsidiaries and affiliates to per- 
form brokerage services, the exemptions from the federal securities laws applicable to banks 
do not apply. Thus, the provisions of the Securities Act would apply to brokerage activities 
conducted by a bank holding company subsidiary. 
131. Banks remain exempt from the Securities Act. They are subject only to supervision 
by the appropriate bank regulatory agencies. 15 U.S.C. 5 78/(i) (1982). In 1974, the bank 
regulatory agencies were directed to issue securities regulations for banks that were "substan- 
tially equivalent" to those issued by the SEC. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1503-04 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 78/(i) (1982)). 
132. Banks and bank holding companies are exempt from the definition of the term "in- 
vestment adviser" set forth in the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982). 
Bank affiliates or subsidiaries, however, are not so exempt and are subject to the Investment 
Advisers Act when they perform investment advisory services within the coverage of the Act. 
133. While individual investment managers are subject to the provisions of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-3(a)(1982), banks are expressly excluded from the 
Act's coverage, id 5 80a-3(c) (3). 
134. Id 5 80a-3(a). 
135. Id 5 77g. 
136. Id 5 78j@). 
137. Rule lob-5, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, makes it  "un- 
lawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails" to make representations which are materially mislead- 
ing "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). 
Rule 134, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, permits specified items of 
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ject to the terms of the Investment Company Act and the Investment 
Advisers Act. 
In contrast, bank common and collective trust funds are subject to 
quite different regulatory treatment. The concept of a common trust 
fund was first recognized in the Revenue Act of 1936,13* which estab- 
lished a tax exemption for bank common trust funds "maintained by a 
bank . . . (1) exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment 
of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee, 
executor, . . . or guardian; and (2) in conformity with the rules and 
regulations . . . of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
Congress made it clear that the bank regulators were to assure 
that bank common trust funds would not be "over-commercialized" or 
used for "speculative purposes. "'* In 1937, the Federal Reserve Board 
adopted section 17 of Regulation F, authorizing national and state 
member banks to establish common trust funds.14' Section 17 expressly 
provided that the new authority could not be used to promote commin- 
gled investment management services.142 The Federal Reserve Board 
accompanied its strict limitations on the use of common trust funds with 
equally strict prohibitions against bank advertising of such funds.'43 
Similar restrictions on the promotion of common trust funds have been 
maintained by the Comptroller of the Currency through regulations 
which flatly forbid advertising and only permit distributing copies of the 
financial reports of common trust funds to persons who request them or 
to prospective trust customers.'44 
Additional examples of such overlapping and inconsistent jurisdic- 
information to be included in investment company advertising without requiring that the 
advertising be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus. Id. 5 230.134. 
Rule 156, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, is interpretative in nature 
and highlights the types of representations which the SEC's experience suggests are most 
likely to be misleading. Id. 9 230.156. 
Rule 482, recently issued by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933, further in- 
creases the flexibility and scope of investment company advertising by permitting investment 
companies to publish a broader range of information than was previously permitted, through 
the use of an "omitting prospectus." Id. 5 230.482. 
138. Ch. 690, § 169, 49 Stat. 1648, 1708 (codified at I.R.C. 5 584 (1982)). 
139. 49 Stat. at 1708. 
140. Amendments to Regulation F, 2 Fed. Reg. 3440 (1937). 
141. Id. 
142. Section 17 states, in part, that "the operation of such common trust funds as invest- 
ment trusts for other than strictly fiduciary purposes is hereby prohibited." Id. 
143. Id. 
144. The regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency do not permit a bank to advertise 
its common trust fund service. A bank may indicate, however, that it has an annual report 
available concerning its common trust fund activities in connection with the promotion of its 
fiduciary services. 12 C.F.R. 5 9.18@) (5)(iv)-(v) (1983). 
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tions are seen in the regulation of mutual funds, commodity futures 
pools, stock options, and commodity futures options. Like mutual 
funds, commodity futures pools are subject to the advertising and disclo- 
sure requirements of the Securities Act. Unlike mutual funds, however, 
commodity futures pools are not subject to substantive regulation under 
the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act. Op- 
tions on stocks are policed by the SEC, while options on commodity 
futures are regulated by the CFTC.145 Stock option investors get Securi- 
ties Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) protection, while commod- 
ity options purchasers have no insurance if a broker fails.146 Margin 
rules for financing options transactions are set by the Federal Reserve 
Board, while margin rules for financing commodities transactions are set 
by the boards of the futures exchanges.I4' 
4. Demise of Clan-$teagall.-The crumbling of Glass-Steagall Act 
barriers to investment activities by commercial banks has been well doc- 
umented.14' Suffice it to say that the Congress, courts, and regulators 
have permitted all of the following securities activities by banks or bank 
holding company subsidiaries (some of which are currently the subject 
of litigation): 
- underwriting and dealing in Treasury bonds and state 
and local general obligation bonds;149 
- underwriting and dealing in many types of state and local 
revenue bonds; 150 
145. CFTC regulations relating to commodity option transactions are set forth at 17 
C.F.R. 5 32 (1983). 
146. Stock option investors are protected by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 
15 U.S.C. 5 78aaa (1982). Regulations for the protection of commodity options purchasers 
are set forth at 12 C.F.R. 5 166 (1983). 
147. Compare Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. $5 221.1-.4 (1983) (providing an example of margin 
regulation by the Federal Reserve Board), with 17 C.F.R. 5 1.30 (1983) (providing an exam- 
ple of margin regulation by the CFTC). 
148. See, c.g., Pitt & Williams, supra note 89; Note, A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the Gfas-  
Steagaff Act, 91 YALE L.J. 102 (1981). 
149. See, e .8 ,  12 C.F.R. 1.3(g) (1983). The Glass-Steagall Act permits banks to under- 
write general obligation bonds of state and local governments. Such bonds are backed by the 
full faith and credit of a governmental body having general powers of taxation, including 
property taxation. 
- - 
150. Banks are prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act from underwriting bonds issued by a 
state or municipality unless those bonds represent general obligations. 12 U.S.C. 5 24 (1982). 
Revenue bonds, unlike "general obligations" are not backed by the full resources and taxing 
power of a governmental unit, but only by the resources of a particular revenue producing 
project or separate source of funds. In the early 1960's, the Comptroller of the Currency 
issued several rulings permitting national bank underwriting of state and municipal bonds 
which were not backed by entities having general taxing powers. Investment Securities Regu- 
lation, Eligibility of Specific Bond Issues for Purchase by National Banks, 27 Fed. Reg. 6748- 
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- acting as financial adviser to issuers of state and local rev- 
enue bonds;151 
- acting as a discount broker, and perhaps a full service bro- 
ker, for corporate securities of all kinds;15' 
- underwriting and dealing in corporate securities of all 
kinds outside the United States;'53 
- acting as agent for corporations in arranging private 
placements of debt and equity ~ e c u r i t i e s ; ' ~ ~  
- acting as broker for interest-rate futures  contract^;'^^ 
-- 
49 (1962). The Federal Reserve Board, on the other hand, disagreed with the comptroller's 
interpretation and specifically prohibited state member banks from underwriting these types 
of bonds. 12 C.F.R. 5 250.120 (1983). In Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247,252 
(D.D.C. 1966), afdmbnom. Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts &Co!, 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 
1968), the court followed the position taken by the Federal Reserve Board and held that 
banks may only underwrite bonds which are backed by the full faith and credit of a govern- 
mental entity possessing general powers of taxation. However, as determined by both the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board, the bonds do not have to be 
issued by such an entity, but only directly or indirectly backed by one. 12 C.F.R. $5 1.120, 
250.122 (1983); see aho Eligibility of Securities for Purchase, Dealing in, Underwriting and 
Holding by National Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 5701, 5702-03 (1982) (comments). Moreover, 12 
U.S.C. 5 24 periodically has been amended to permit banks to underwrite and deal in certain 
kinds of revenue bonds. 
15 1. See, for example, the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Governors v. Invest- 
ment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 55 (1981). The Court characterized investment advisory activi- 
ties as a facet of the traditional fiduciary functions of banks. Banks and bank holding 
companies are exempt from the definition of the term "investment adviser" under the Invest- 
ment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(11) (1982). 
152. Discount brokerage activities performed by banks or bank holding companies have 
been determined not to violate the Glass-Steagall Act. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 19831, af'd, 104 S. Ct. 1905 
(1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, [Current] FED. BANKING L. 
REP. (CCH) 1 99,771 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 1983). The Comptroller of the Currency recently 
authorized a combination of discount brokerage and traditional bank investment manage- 
ment services. Application of American National Bank of Austin, Texas, [Current] FED. 
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,732 (Sept. 23, 1983). 
153. Secgenerafh Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, $5 2(7), 5, 48 Stat. 74, 75, 77-78 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(7), e (1982)) (section 2(7) of the Act defines inter- 
state commerce as including trade or commerce in securities between a state and any foreign 
country; section 5 sets forth requirements to be met before securities can be traded or sold in 
interstate commerce). 
154. See gmrrolh The New York Clearinghouse Association, Commercial Bank Aiunfe Place- 
ment Advisory Snvices: The Legal and Ablic Policy Issues, 95 BANKING L.J. 333 (1978). 
The Comptroller of the Currency has indicated that, in his opinion, "the proper legal 
judgment is that Glass-Steagall does not prohibit private placement activity as presently con- 
ducted by commercial banks." Propriep of Nafional Bank Aiuafe Placmtntl Acfiuip in Lzghf of fhc 
Ch-SfeapaN Acf, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 85,107, at 
77,103 (Dm. 9, 1978). 
155. A recently promulgated federal regulation includes the following in a list of permissi- 
ble nonbanking activities for bank holding companies and their subsidiaries: 
Acting as a futures commission merchant for nonaffiliated persons in the execution 
and clearance on major commodity exchanges of futures contracts and options on 
futures contracts for bullion, foreign exchange, government securities, certificates of 
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- acting as investment manager for individuals, trusts, pen- 
sion funds, and investment companies of all kinds.'56 
Whatever legal analysis tells us about the correctness of the foregoing 
judgments, it is plain that the Glass-Steagall Act has lost its moral force. 
5 De Facto Interstate Banking.-(a) Banktirg Services.-As one observer 
recently noted, "Although interstate banking is prohibited by the 
McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment, the fact is that banking 
organizations are providing services across state lines and have been do- 
ing so for some time."15' In non-retail banking, especially when con- 
ducted by the largest corporations in the United States, the "bars" to 
interstate banking have little importance.158 One recent study found 
that domestic banking organizations control at least 7383 interstate of- 
fices, and if interstate offices of foreign banking organizations are in- 
cluded, the total reaches 7840.15' Almost 1500 such interstate offices 
supply general banking services. The Bank Holding Company Act al- 
lows bank holding companies to establish or acquire nonbank subsidiar- 
ies which provide lending and related services "closely related to 
banking" that are not subject to the prohibitions on interstate bank- 
ing.160 Moreover, loan production offices16' and nonbank subsidiaries 
deposit and other money market instruments that a bank may buy or sell in the cash 
market for its own account if [certain conditions are met]. 
49 Fed. Reg. 826, 828 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 5 225.25). 
156. For example, pursuant to Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. 5 225 (1983), and related interpre- 
tative rulings, the Federal Reserve Board has determined that a bank holding company may 
act as an investment adviser for an open-end or closed-end investment company, and in addi- 
tion, may organize, operate, or control a closed-end investment company. Src 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 225.4(a)(5), 225.125 (1983). In Board ofGovernon v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,78 
(1981), the Supreme Court specifically upheld the Federal Reserve Board's regulation with 
respect to advising closed-end companies. 
157. Whitehead, Infnshfe EaBonc Takrig Invrnfory, &ON. REV., May 1983, at 4 (pub- 
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). 
158. S c  Brouillette, * a  note 97, at 1; Fraust, Craning Sfate Lincs, mpra note 97, at 1; 
Fraust, Ba& Stake Oui An Infrrshfe Future, supra note 97, at 1. 
159. Whitehead, nrpra note 157, at 18. Whitehead found a total of 55,440 banking offices 
in the United States. 
160. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). The Bank Holding Company Act allows bank holding 
companies to offer virtually any "bank-like" service, except the acceptance of deposits, on a 
multi-state basis. Thus, bank holding companies have activated nationwide networks of con- 
sumer finance, mortgage banking, and other financial activities. 
161. An interpretative ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency authorizes national banks 
to operate "loan production offices" for the purpose of originating loans. The ruling states 
that such offices will not be considered "branches" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. 5 36(f), 
provided that the loans are approved and made at a main or branch bffice of the bank. 45 
Fed. Reg. 53,080 (1980) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 5 7.7380 (1984)). 
For a time, the future of loan production offices was in doubt. In 1979, the District 
Court for the District of Columbia, holding that loan production offices constituted branch 
banks under 12 U.S.C. 5 36, ordered the Comptroller of the Currency to rescind its interpre- 
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such as Edge Act c ~ r p o r a t i o n s ' ~ ~  allow banks to provide interstate finan- 
cial services. 
Even in the area of retail banking, deposit taking and consumer 
lending functions present clear examples of the reality of interstate 
banking. Banks accept deposits indirectly from all over the country.163 
Money market funds operate without concern for state boundaries when 
they perform a commingling function for small account holders and 
purchase large certificates of deposit (CDs) issued by banks.16" More- 
over, securities firms have begun to market, through their nationwide 
offices, the insured CDs of banks and savings in~t i tut i0ns . l~~ The con- 
sumer lending function presents even clearer evidence of de facto inter- 
state banking. The advent of credit card lending by bank owned 
finance and mortgage companies represents a substantial penetration of 
the consumer loan market throughout the country. 
(b) Actiu2tte.s of States Promoting Interstate Banking.--St ates have acted 
directly to position themselves for, and promote the legalization of, in- 
terstate banking. Delaware, for example, passed its Financial Center 
Development Act (FCDA)166 in February 1981. The FCDA was Dela- 
ware's invitation to out-of-state banks to establish banking operations 
within the state. It was premised on the Douglas Amendment's prohibi- 
tion on interstate banking except in the case of express invitation by 
state legislation. Its provisions included elimination of interest rate ceil- 
ings for banks, flexible credit provisions, and low rates of bank 
taxation.16' 
On December 30, 1982, Massachusetts enacted a law "permit- 
tative ruling. The following year, however, the district court's decision was reversed on ap- 
peal and the comptroller's interpretative ruling was reinstated. Independent Bankers Ass'n of 
Am. v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court of appeals reversed, not on the 
merits, but because the IBAA had delayed bringing suit until 12 years after the interpretative 
ruling was published and was therefore barred by laches. The court noted, however, that "we 
have serious questions about" the district court's decision on the merits as well. Id at 488. 
162. So-called Edge Act corporations operate on a multi-state basis and offer both deposit 
and loan services as long as they are confined to international trade and are available only for 
that service to business customers. See 12 U.S.C. $!$! 61 1-632 (1982). The International Bank- 
ing Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. $!$! 3101-3108 (1982), substantially broadened the powers of Edge 
Act corporations by authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to allow them to branch inter- 
state and to broaden their operating flexibility. 
163. See supra note 158. 
164. Id 
165. Id 
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, $! 770 (Supp. 1982). 
167. Ripsom, Swayze & Sheehan, A Reuiew of De/aware Bankins DeucIopmmts, BANKING EX-  
PANSION REP., NOV. 7, 1983, at 1, 13. 
168. 1982 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 626 (Law. Co-op.) (codified in scattered sections of 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 167, 167A, 167B, 167C, 167E, 168, 170, 172 (West 1984)). 
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ting depository institutions, or their holding companies, in any of the 
five other New England states to merge with or acquire banks or thrift 
institutions in Massachusetts, so long as the entering institution is in a 
New England state that has enacted a reciprocal law permitting entry 
by Massachusetts' financial institutions. "I6' Connecticut and Rhode Is- 
land have also enacted regional reciprocity statutes,170 which permit 
bank holding companies in other New England states to acquire or cre- 
ate new in-state banks, provided that the home state of the out-of-state 
bank holding company has a similar statute.171 Although it has ap- 
proved transactions based on reciprocity statutes, the Federal Reserve 
Board has expressed concern about the development of regional inter- 
state banking, observing that "there is a potential danger that the result 
could be to divide the country into a number of banking regions."172 
(c) Interstale Expamion ofSauings and Loan Associations.-A1 t hough there 
is no statutory prohibition on interstate activities by savings and loan 
associations, until recently the FHLBB prohibited such activities. The 
need to find merger partners for failing thrift institutions, however, has 
encouraged more flexibility on the part of the FHLBB. O n  August 16, 
1982, the FHLBB announced that Fidelity Savings and Loan Associa- 
tion of Oakland, California (Fidelity), would be acquired by C i t i ~ 0 r p . l ~ ~  
169. Golembe, Massachurefb and Inftr~fafe Banking, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Jan. 17, 
1983, at 1. 
Citicorp has challenged the Massachusetts statute and a similar Connecticut statute 
on the grounds that they violate the contract, commerce, and supremacy clauses of the 
United States Constitution. Memorandum of Citicorp in Opposition to the Application for 
Approval to Merge, In  re Application of Bank of New England Corp., Proceedings before the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Dec. 1983. 
170. The Connecticut and Rhode Island statutes are located, respectively, at 1983 Conn. 
Legis. Serv. 41 1 (West); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 19-30-2 (Supp. 1983). 
17 1. Maine allows out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire in-state banks on essen- 
tially the same terms that apply to acquisitions by in-state holding companies. ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 5 1013 (Supp. 1983). Three New England transactions based on regional 
reciprocity statutes have been approved by the Federal Reserve Board: (1) Bank of New 
England Corporation received approval to acquire CBT Corporation, 70 FED. RESERVE 
BULL. 374 (1984); (2) Hartford National Corporation received approval to acquire Arltru 
Bancorporation, 70 FED. RESERVE BULL. 353 (1984); and (3) Bank of Boston Corporation 
received approval to acquire Colonial Bancorp of Connecticut, Federal Reserve Board deci- 
sion of May 18, 1984, dtjmscdin BANKING EXPANSION REP., June 4, 1984, at 2-3. 
172. Federal Reserve Board decision, niedin BANKING EXPANSION REP., supra note 171; see 
aLro 70 FED. RESERVE BULL. 374 (1984). 
173. Order, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Aug. 16, 1982. The FHLBB had sought a 
merger partner for Fidelity since April 1982, when Fidelity was put into FSLIC receivership 
and bids were invited. Under the terms of the Citicorp bid that was approved, FSLIC assist- 
ance could amount to $165 million over the twelve-year term of the-proposal, but would 
decline to $50 million if short-term interest rates were to fall to less than 10%: Citicorp agreed 
to provide enough equity capital to increase Fidelity's net worth to 3% of its liabilities and to 
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The approval of the Federal Reserve Board also was required because 
the acquisition fell under section 1843(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Com- 
pany The Federal Reserve Board issued its approval on Septem- 
ber 28, 1982.'75 In allowing Citicorp to acquire Fidelity, the first 
instance of a cross-industry interstate merger, the Federal Reserve Board 
said it took into account "the beneficial effect on the financial commu- 
nity as a whole of implementing an additional mechanism for the solu- 
tion of difficult problems for the thrift industry and the federal 
insurance funds posed by the poor earnings" of the thrift industry.176 
Subsequently, the FHLBB proposed a rule to permit nonsupervi- 
sory interstate mergers, acquisitions, and branching when state laws spe- 
cifically permit entry by out-of-state institutions.17' The FHLBB 
advocated a "host state" approach under which a federally-chartered 
thrift could branch into a state, either by establishing a new office there 
or by merging with an institution in the host state, provided that the 
host state permitted state-chartered thrifts from other states to engage in 
similar activities. 
(d) Interstate Expanrlbn ofNonbank Banks.-The possibility of acquiring 
nonbank banks in a number of states to form an interstate organization 
without regard to the strictures of the Douglas Amendment1'* is the as- 
pect of nonbank bank expansion which is most threatening to tradi- 
tional regulatory patterns. Such networks of nonbank banks have the 
potential to link brokerage, commercial, and industrial activities with 
interstate deposit taking.17' 
Dimension Financial Corporation (Dimension) provides a good 
provide additional equity as needed to maintain that ratio. The FHLBB estimated Citicorp's 
initial contribution at more than $80 million. 
174. Scc 12 U.S.C. 5 1843(c)(8) (1982). 
175. Citicorp, 68 FED. RESERVE BULL. 656 (1982). 
176. This was, of course, a departure from established policy. In 1977, for example, in its 
Order Denying Retention of Empire Savings, Building and Loan Association by D.H. Bald- 
win Company (cifedin id app.), the Federal Reserve Board identified three potential adverse 
effects that could be expected to result from the affiliation of a bank and a savings and loan 
association: 
(a) a conflict between the statutory and regulatory frameworks within which such 
banks and savings and loan associations operate; 
@) an erosion of institutional rivalry between banks and savings and loan associa- 
tions; and 
(c) a potential for undermining federal prohibitions against interstate banking. 
63 FED. RESERVE BULL. 280 (1977). 
177. Interstate Transactions Involving Insured Institutions, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,930 (1983) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. 5s 556.5, 563.22)(proposed May 10, 1983). 
178. 12 U.S.C. 5 1842(d) (1982). 
179. See Eisenbeis, Re~ional Forccs/or Infer~fate Banking, =ON. REV., May 1983, at 24 (pub- 
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). 
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example of the interstate expansion possibilities of nonbank banks. In 
1983, Dimension announced plans to set up thirty-one consumer ori- 
ented nonbank banks in twenty-five states.''' Since these banks would 
not engage in commercial lending, and would therefore not constitute 
"banks" within the meaning of the Bank Holding Company Act,"' Di- 
mension would not be subject to the interstate restrictions of the Doug- 
las Amendment or the regulatory supervision of the Federal Reserve 
Board. On May 9, 1984, the comptroller granted preliminary approval 
to Dimension to organize four banks and gave Dimension thirty days to 
designate which four banks it would 0rgani~e.l '~ The comptroller 
stated that Dimension's "applications represent a sound banking con- 
cept . . . [which is] permissible under applicable federal statutes. ,9183 
Because Dimension had no operating history, however, the comptroller 
reserved judgment on the remaining twenty-seven applications. Dimen- 
sion will be permitted to renew its request for preliminary approvals of 
additional banks only after the initial four banks have opened and have 
established satisfactory operating re~0rds.l '~ 
Economic forces have thrust market participants into fierce compe- 
tition. The rate of development of new financial products has been ex- 
traordinary, and as each new product forces itself through a real or 
imagined loophole in the complex set of laws that govern financial insti- 
tutions, regulators and the Congress are faced with the decision of 
whether to permit the development or to intervene and stop it. The 
enormous inertia retarding legislative change usually prompts a deci- 
sion, by design or default, to do nothing. 
A. Studies and Commissions 
Part of the reason for this inertia is the uncomfortable feeling 
among politicians and regulators that individual steps to restructure the 
markets or the regulatory system should only be taken as part of an 
overall plan. That notion was surely behind Congressman Timothy 
Wirth's call for a Capital Markets Commi~sion,"~ SEC Chairman John 
180. Am. Banker, Feb. 18, 1983, at 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1983, at 6, col. 3. 
181. See supra note 105. 
182. Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Applications of Dimension Finan- 
cial Corporation to Charter Thirty-One National Banks in Twenty-Five States (May 9, 1984), 
rcpnnted in 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 8 15 (May 14, 1984). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. In August 1982, Representative Timothy Wirth introduced legislation to establish a 
Capital Markets Commission to study and evaluate the nation's long-term capital require- 
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Shad's proposal to simplify and rationalize regulation of financial serv- 
ice~ , ' '~  and the Reagan administration's more limited step in appointing 
the Bush Task Group.'" 
The preference for studying the big picture is not surprising, nor is 
it new."' Previous efforts to review the regulation of financial institu- 
tions have been more or less systematic attempts to look at what was 
ments and to determine what changes might be needed in federal and state financial policies 
to meet these requirements. The Capital Markets Commission was to have been charged 
with four primary functions: 
1. Examination of the capital needs of the United States economy to sus- 
tain short-term and long-term economic growth, by business sector and geographic 
region; 
2. Examination of the ability of financial intermediaries to raise and allo- 
cate such capital; 
3. Analysis of the impact of federal and state laws and policies on such 
matters as the fairness and efficiency of capital allocation, the fairness of competi- 
tion between such intermediaries, and the impact of differences in regulation over 
intermediaries offering similar instruments and products; and 
4. Assessment of the safety and soundness of financial intermediaries. 
H.R. 7014, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
186. On February 4, 1982, Chairman John Shad of the SEC proposed a program to sim- 
plify and rationalize regulation of financial services. The SEC program would begin with the 
appointment of a nonpartisan task force of experienced executives and authorities who would 
study the possibility of regulating certain products and activities by functions rather than by 
"outmoded industry classifications." The task force would consider consolidation of related 
regulatory activities with a view toward reducing conflicts and administrative costs and in- 
creasing operational efficiency and financial flexibility. SEC Proposrs Fiue-Point Program to Re- 
Jom2 Financial Smices Regulation, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 251 (Feb. 10, 1982). 
187. In its request for public comments on the problems and possible reorganization of the 
existing system of federal regulation of financial institutions gnd services, the Bush Task 
Group cited a number of reform issues and options, including: (a) the reorganization of de- 
pository regulators; @) the possible reorganization, consolidation, or coordination of issues 
among agencies dealing with securities trading, commodity futures trading, and depository 
institutions; (c) the possible consolidation of the three federal deposit insurance agencies and 
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC); and (d) the extent to which current 
regulatory or statutory restrictions on financial institutions or their holding companies should 
be eliminated or modified. 48 Fed. Reg. 5704 (1983). 
188. The sheer number of studies which have considered banking regulation is impressive. 
Prominent studies include: Fimncia/ Instifufionr Supmisory Act of 1966: Heanngs on S 3/58 
Before the Subcomm. on Finoncia/ fnrlilutions of the & a t e  Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1966); Conrolidation of Bank Examining andSupmiso'y Functionr. Heanhgs on HR. f07and 
HR. 6885 Bcfore the Subcomm. on Bank Supemirjon and Imrancc o/the Hourc Comm. on Banking and 
Currmcy, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Conplct o/FederalandState Banking Lows: Hearings Bcfore 
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88t h Cong., 1 st Sess. (1 963); Ifoposed Fcdcral &Bang 
Commiszion and Federal Deposit and Sauings Insurance Board Heanngs on H R. 729 and H R. 5874 
Before the Subcomm. on Banking Supnuision and Insurance of the Housr Comm. on Bunking and Currency, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Inc~eascd Flcxibilip for Fimntiaf Institufionr.. Hearings on H R .  5845, 
H R. 7878, H R. 8230, H R. 8245, H R. 8247, H R. 8459, and H R. 854f Before the House Comm. 
on Banking and Cunmcy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Reuiew of the Rcport of the Cornmiinon on 
Monry and Credit: Heankgs Be+ theJoint Economic Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); COMM. 
ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1963). 
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perceived as the "whole" of the regulatory structure. In 1962, for exam- 
ple, the Advisory Committee on Banking to the Comptroller of the Cur- 
rency (Comptroller's Committee) recommended that the Federal 
Reserve Board's bank supervisory powers be terminated and that super- 
visory authority relating to national banks be transferred entirely to the 
Comptroller of the C ~ r r e n c y . ' ~ ~  All authority relating to state banks 
would have been transferred to the FDIC, and the FDIC was to be reor- 
ganized and placed under the control of a single administrator within 
the Treasury Department. The Comptroller's Committee also suggested 
that authority over the formation and expansion of bank holding com- 
panies be transferred from the Federal Reserve Board to the Comptrol- 
ler of the Currency, and that the Federal Reserve Board's authority to 
set margin requirements and deposit interest rates be transferred to the 
Secretary of the Treasury. Furthermore, the authority of the Federal 
Reserve Board and the FDIC to regulate branches of state banks was to 
be relinquished to the respective state bank supervisory agencies.''' 
In 1971, the Hunt Commission, bowing to the political power of 
state bank regulators, recommended establishing three new agencies: 
the Office of the National Bank Administrator, which would have the 
supervisory responsibilities of the Comptroller of the Currency with re- 
spect to national banks and would be an agency independent of the 
Treasury Department; the Office of the Administrator of State Banks, 
which would assume the examination and supervision responsibilities 
for state-chartered insured commercial and mutual savings banks cur- 
rently exercised by the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC; and the 
Federal Deposit Guarantee Administration, which would incorporate 
under its umbrella the FDIC, the FSLIC, and the Credit Union Insur- 
ance Corporation (CUIC).L91 The Federal Reserve Board would have 
retained its authority to implement monetary policy and administer the 
Bank Holding Company Act.lg2 
In 1975, a study commissioned by the House Committee on Bank- 
ing, Currency, and Housing (commonly referred to as the "FINE 
Study") recommended creating a single supervisory agency, the Federal 
Depository Institutions Commission, which was to administer all super- 
visory functions of the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptrol- 
189. ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKING, COMPTROLLER O F T H E  CURRENCY, NATIONAL 
BANKS AND THE FUTURE 138 (1962). 
190. Id. 
191. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION, REPORT 
87-92 (1971). 
192. Id 
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ler of the Currency, the FHLBB, and the NCUA.lg3 A subsidiary 
agency of the Federal Depository Institutions Commission would have 
handled insurance  function^.'^^ 
B. The Problem M/lih Shrfing Boxes On Organziatrbnal Charts 
The problem with all of the foregoing efforts at regulatory restruc- 
turing is that they attempt to find a new congruence between financial 
institutions and existing regulators. That task requires a prescience 
about the ultimate shape of the financial industry that is simply beyond 
the powers of government planners and advisers, even the blue-ribbon 
variety. Instead, there must be a fundamental rethinking of regulatory 
patterns designed to match the financial functions which are to be regu- 
lated. In an era dominated by cross-industry financial institutions and 
products, there is no justification for the regulation of similar functions 
by different regulators, each operating with distinct substantive and pro- 
cedural regulations, rules, and standards. 
It is time to confront the regulatory anomalies, develop a new tax- 
onomy of the functions performed in the financial marketplace, and de- 
vise a new structure for regulating those functions.lg5 The creation of a 
new model-a new paradigm- should be the goal. In creating this new 
paradigm it may be necessary to discard much of the accumulated regu- 
latory baggage that often has obstructed the vision of those who have 
previously confronted the problem. As Stephen Toulmin said, "There is 
only one way of seeing one's own spectacles clearly: that is, to take them 
off. It is impossible to focus both on them and through them at the same 
time."lg6 It is time to place the data in a new system of relations and 
provide a new framework for analysis.197 
IV. REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 
A. A Need to Ask Fundamental Questions 
The essential task in the creation of a new paradigm for regulating 
financial functions and institutions is to identify the regulatory values or 
goals that have contemporary significance and to design a system that 
facilitates achievement of these goals. The task must begin with a deter- 
mination of objectives, proceed to an examination of the alternative 
193. See supra note 125, at 12. 
194. Id. 
195. CJ T .  KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-53 (2d ed. 1970) 
("Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly . . . ."). 
196. S. TOULMIN, FORESIGHT AND UNDERSTANDING 101 (1961). 
197. CJ H .  B U ~ E R F I E L D ,  THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE 1300-1800, at 1-7 (rev. ed. 
1957). 
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methods of attaining those objectives, and culminate with the choice of 
an operating plan.lg8 Although that is not an easy undertaking, the 
very attempt should advance the cause of facilitating more effective and 
efficient regulation of financial institutions. 
B. Coal. of Regulation 
The goals that must be achieved by a regulatory system for the 
financial services industry can be summarized as follows: efficiency of 
regulation, flexibility, fair dealing, safety and soundness, avoidance of 
concentration, and efficient implementation of monetary policy.199 
1. E@iency.-Arthur Okun states in Equali$y and E@iency,200 that 
"The government must be accountable to the citizens, [but] accounta- 
bility is as costly in resources as it is precious to the integrity of the 
political process."201 Efficiency of regulation is achieved when financial 
regulators and regulations distort the behavior of market participants 
only to the extent required to achieve valid public policy goals. Incon- 
sistent, duplicative rules affecting identical financial functions and im- 
posed by different government agencies cause private sector marketing 
efforts, and therefore capital flows, to be affected by differences in regu- 
latory philosophy rather than by considerations of economic efficiency 
and equality. Quintessential examples of such inefficiency are the open 
warfare between the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Re- 
serve Board on the "nonbank bank" issue202 and the differences in regu- 
lation of stock index options and stock index futures, which fall under 
the respective jurisdictions of the SEC and the CFTC. 
When a system is based upon inconsistent rules, the mix between 
regulation and free market activity is sub-optimal. To  the extent that 
the problem is due to overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, as is often the 
case in the financial marketplace, greater efficiency would be achieved 
through consolidation of functionally similar regulatory responsibilities. 
In making the following suggestions, we do not ignore the formida- 
ble political barriers to their implementation. We are not so naive as to 
suggest that legislative programs embodying these proposals in their en- 
198. Breyer, Anahzing Rcgulafov Failurc: Mismafchcs, h~rss Rcsfncfiuc Alfmfiucs ,  and Rcfom, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 550 (1979). 
199. For a summary of traditional goals of financial regulation, see Chase, Thc Sfrucfurc of 
Fcdcral Rrgulafion of Dcps i foy  INlriufionr, in HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND 
H o u a ~ c ,  FINANCIAL ~NSTITUT~ONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY: COMPENDIUM O F  PA- 
PERS PREPARED FOR THE FINE STUDY 149 (Comm. Print 1976). 
200. A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE-OFF (1975). 
201. Id. at 60. 
202. Scc supra note 105. 
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tirety would have any substantial likelihood of immediate success. But 
individual decisions that, in the aggregate, shape the financial system 
are being made all the time as part of the ongoing process of political 
compromise, and we view these proposals as lodestars to guide such de- 
cisions and to fix the direction in which the systems should evolve. 
The starting point for consolidation efforts should be the transfer of 
primary responsibility for regulating larger state and national banks and 
bank holding companies to a single regulator. These institutions com- 
Pete in the same markets and should be subject not only to the same 
rules but also to the same set of regulatory attitudes. There are many 
persons and institutions, of course, who defend the current panoply of 
multiple regulators on the grounds that it avoids the consequences of 
monolithic power, provides a competitive counterweight to the heavy 
hand of regulation, and allows greater opportunity for experimenta- 
tion.'03 Such arguments have some appeal. There are surely times, of 
which the present is one, when one regulator prefers to push forward 
faster than others and thus leads in developing new approaches to sys- 
temic problems. 
But competition among regulators may work to retard change as 
well as to implement it. To some extent, the very process of competition 
among the regulators makes the regulatory system nonadaptive and un- 
predictable and thereby also inhibits efficiency. Many changes cannot, 
as a practical matter, be made without the concurrence of all regulators. 
In those cases, any one agency effectively can veto change. Moreover, 
even when all regulators are in concurrence, change may be imposed in 
an uncoordinated manner without regard for the interests of competing 
financial institutions. For example, in the 1970's the regulators were 
agonizingly slow to identify the need to phase out deposit interest rate 
controls, but in the 1980's, those controls were dropped abruptly. 
In comparison, the advantages that might be derived from a cen- 
tralized regulatory authority are considerable.z04 A single regulator 
would eliminate conflicting goals, achieve greater efficiency and econ- 
omy of regulation, and eliminate actual or potential policy conflicts be- 
tween agencieszo5 Such an approach would simplify administration 
and improve communication both within the regulator itself and be- 
203. See, e.g., Letter from Herbert W. Gray, Chairman of the National Association of Mu- 
tual Savings Banks, to Bush Task Group (Mar. 14, 1983). 
204. For a listing of unification proposals, see Hackley , Our Bo$kng Bonking Sysfem-Part I//, 
52 VA. L. REV. 771, 799-830 (1966). Scc also Chase, supra note 199, at 149-64; Robertson, 
F e h l  Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unzjcafion, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 686-95 
(1966). 
205. Robertson, supra note 204, at 687. 
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tween financial institutions and the regulator. A single regulator would 
also reduce uneven application of identical federal statutes to different 
financial institutions, and would facilitate prompt adjustment of regula- 
tion to changes in the financial markets. 
The next step should be to consolidate regulation of different kinds 
of depository institutions. Surely the safety and soundness, monetary 
policy, and competitive equality considerations applicable to large sav- 
ings institutions do not differ materially from those applicable to many 
large banks. Although there are differences in asset and liability powers 
between banks and savings and loan associations, and the mortgage- 
credit allocation functions of savings and loan associations are not appli- 
cable to banks, those differences do not reduce the desirability of uni- 
form regulation. 
As a complementary step toward rationality, the jurisdiction of the 
SEC and CFTC over derivative investment products should be consoli- 
dated. Just as banks and savings and loan associations are offering es- 
sentially interchangeable products to retail depositors and home 
mortgage borrowers, broker-dealers and futures commission merchants 
are offering similar products to the public. 
Considerations of efficiency have implications for the development 
of substantive as well as jurisdictional rules for regulatory agencies. The 
money market fund phenomenon, the expanded powers of thrift institu- 
tions, and the evolution of new insurance products have caused a sub- 
stantial portion of the transaction account deposit base to be transferred 
outside the commercial banking system.206 Because investment manag- 
ers of money market funds, savings and loan associations, and insurance 
companies are not subject to the Glass-Steagall Act,'07 considerations of 
efficiency led to the union of corporate affiliates engaged in traditional 
banking functions, such as deposit taking and consumer loans, with 
other affiliates engaged in investment banking. If investment banking 
has not proven dangerous for these depository institutions, then the un- 
derlying premise of the Glass-Steagall Act, that association with invest- 
206. Sec, c.g., LaFalce, Banking in fhc E~ghfics, 37 Bus. LAW. 839 (1982) (discussion of growth 
in assets of money market funds). The authorization for savings and loan associations to 
engage in new demand deposit activities is set forth at 12 U.S.C. 5 1464@)(1)(A) (1982). 
207. See also the proposal of the FDIC to allow state nonmember banks to engage in 
securities activities. Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,155 (1983) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 337)@roposed May 17, 1983). The basis of the FDIC's proposal is 
a determination that "it is not unlawful under the Glass-Steagall Act for an insured nonmem- 
ber bank to establish or acquire a bona fide subsidiary [engaging] in securities activities nor 
for an insured nonmember bank to become affiliated with a company engaged in securities 
activities." Id. 
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ment banking is dangerous for banks, would seem to be mistaken.208 
2. Flexibili9.-Flexibility in regulation is the ability of a regulatory 
system to adapt to changes in the regulated industry without distorting 
the regulatory system, the industry, or the marketplace generally. The 
goal of regulatory flexibility extends beyond regulatory efficiency, re- 
sponsiveness, and innovation, and includes the desirability of permitting 
market participants to respond to competitive forces in the most efficient 
way. The lack of flexibility is the major problem in financial regulation 
today and the need for flexibility is the basis of the desire for functional 
regulation. 
As we noted earlier, the fundamental premise of the current system 
is that there are different kinds of financial institutions that perform dif- 
ferent functions and therefore ought to have different regulators. That 
premise is no longer valid. Virtually all large financial institutions to- 
day think of themselves as, at least in part, in the business of providing 
investment management services to their customers. Some of those serv- 
ices have special characteristics, such as transaction powers, that carry 
special regulatory implications, but the fact remains that they are all 
competing for the same retail savings dollar by offering similar services. 
One can see this development clearly in adaptive reorganizations at 
major banks aimed at combining all services rendered to individuals, 
including "banking," "investment management," and recently, "broker- 
age," into self-contained personal banking 
3. Fairness.-The objective of dealing fairly with investors and de- 
positors seems almost too obvious to include in a list of regulatory goals. 
One need not look far, however, to realize what a minor role fairness has 
played in the development of our current Fairness to all con- 
sumers buying similar financial products requires that comparable rules 
be applied regardless of the nature of the institutions providing the 
products. 
4. Safety andS0undm.n.-There is no more important or difficult part 
of the debate over the shape of the future regulatory structure than a 
discussion of the need to provide safety and s~undness.~" Nor is there 
208. The simple fact is that the Glass-Steagall Act was a response to particular historical 
conditions. See, e.g., J. BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA: A TRUE DRAMA OF WALL STREET 
1920-1938, at 149 (1969). 
209. See, e.g., Brinson, Fir$! Chicago's Reorganizafion Ife5ent.r Opportunifiesfr /nueslmenf Manage- 
men! Group, 122 TR. & EST., June 1983, at 46. 
210. See, e.g., supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text. 
21 1 .  For a thorough discussion of the rationale behind solvency regulation and some 
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any other aspect of the debate in which the depth of contemporary un- 
derstanding seems so inadequate. Discussions of this issue frequently fail 
to distinguish between several discrete concepts that are best considered 
individually. 
First, it is essential to be clear about which questions present true 
safety and soundness issues and which questions merely echo parochial 
interests. For example, the underwriting of corporate securities may ex- 
pose bank capital to new risks; managing mutual funds does not. 
Second, it is important to understand the link between protecting 
individual depositors and protecting the financial system itself. From 
the perspective of financial institutions, safety and soundness considera- 
tions mean that a regulatory system should prevent institutional failures 
when harm to the financial marketplace would result. In theory, that 
goal is achieved by protecting small depositors with deposit insurance 
and permitting market forces to govern the flow of large, uninsured de- 
posits. In practice, however, large banks have become so dependent 
upon uninsured deposits that the "confidence" of the uninsured, institu- 
tional investor has provided the link between deposits at an individual 
bank and the stability of the financial system as a whole. The travails of 
Continental Illinois have made that Indeed, uninsured deposits 
are the most volatile because they are controlled by professionals and 
because they are so large their withdrawal tends to have the greatest 
impact on the financial system. Thus, in practice, the FDIC has been 
compelled to operate the system to protect uninsured as well as insured 
deposits.213 
The SEC has been taking steps to encourage a higher level of dis- 
closure of problem loans by bank holding companies2'* in the belief that 
continuous disclosure will reduce the "run on the bank" effect of a sud- 
den disclosure of serious problems. In turn, the FDIC has considered 
experimenting with variable, risk-related premiums for deposit insur- 
alternative regulatory approaches, see Edwards & Scott, Regulating the Solumcy of Dcposifog 
Inrliufiom: A ~mpcctivc for Dncplation, in Issum IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 65 (F. Edwards 
ed. 1979). 
212. &c gmcralb Continental Requires Large Capital I n ~ i o n ,  With or Without FDIC Help, 42 
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 1022 (June 18, 1984). 
2 1 3. See, e.g., Regulators, Banks A t  To~ethn R c s u  Package for Con linen fa/ Bank, 42 WASH. FIN. 
REP. (BNA) 847 (May 21, 1984). As part of the financial assistance package to Continental 
Illinois, the FDIC gave its assurance that "all depositors and other general creditors of the 
bank will be fully protected and service to the bank's customers will not be interrupted." Id 
2 14. See, c .8 ,  fi&l SEC Amcndmcnf to Cuidclints on Bank Holding Company Disclosures, Duly- 
Dec.] SEC. RE. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1629 (Aug. 19, 1983); see aho Slater, New Dido-  
sure Rules Wony Lmdcrs, Am. Banker, Nov. 3, 1983, at 1 ,  3; McCue, Croups Speak Out Agaimt 
Reuaiion o/Dirclosurc Rules, Am. Banker, July 26, 1983, at 3. 
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a n ~ e . ~ ' ~  It is doubtful that either approach can cope with problems of 
the scale of Continental Illinois. 
Third, it is important to assess the effect deregulation has had on 
the soundness of the banking industry. Industry officials predict that 
the problems of Continental Illinois will cause Congress to move slowly 
on de regu la t i~n .~ '~  Yet it is clear that when major banks have found 
themselves in trouble in recent years, it has been because of traditional 
banking activities--real estate loans,217 energy loans,218 loans to devel- 
oping countries,219 and government securities a~tivities~~O-not because 
of securities transactions or other exotic activities. It is true that the 
deregulation of deposit interest rates221 has made the business of asset 
and liability management much more complicated and difficult, but 
that, after all, is the traditional business of banking. While it may be 
possible to regulate that traditional business more closely and effec- 
tively, it is doubtful that government scrutiny can fully protect against 
bad business judgment. Perhaps, for that reason, the current thinking of 
bank regulators has been to increase capital requirements to create a 
larger cushion against losses.222 
Fourth, significant questions exist regarding the advisability of in- 
surance for nonbank financial institutions. Insurance is currently pro- 
vided for savings institutions, securities firms, and many insurance 
2 15. Sec FDIC's Pt-oposcd LegIjlation to Improve Deposit Imurancc System, and FDIC Am/yss, 42 
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 925 (May 28, 1984) (text and FDIC's analysis of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Improvements Act of 1984, S. 2699, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.). Section 6 of this bill 
amends section 7(d) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 5 1817 (1982)) to give 
the FDIC flexibility in setting the assessment credits returned to insured banks by basing the 
credits on the risks the banks present to the Permanent Insurance Fund. 
216. Continrnfal Illinois Changes L.egis/alion Outlook, BANKING EXPANSION REP., June 4, 1984, 
at 14; Ferris, The AJmath of Continental, Am. Banker, Aug. 13, 1984, at 1; Rose, Aswing 
Continental's Co&, Am. Banker, July 30, 1984, at 1. 
21 7. See, erg., Ross, Nation? Lor.& REZTD.faults on Duc Notes, The Washington Post, May 
6, 1978, at E2, col. 4; scc aLro C a d  Bank  gel^ Fed Approval to Buy Up W d l a d ,  Am. Banker, 
June 14, 1984, at 30. 
218. Scc, e.g., Thrcc Continental Execs Yiolatcd Bank Ethics Code in Oil DeaLr, Am. Banker, Feb. 
14, 1984, at 3. 
219. Set, e.g., Stnct U S  Ruling to Slash PI& of Banks That Lcnt to Argentim, N.Y. Times, 
June 19, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Carrington & Hertzberg, Amnciaf INlilutiom are Showing the Strain 
of a Decade of Turmoil, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 6. 
220. Scc, e.8, C h e ?  Battle to Catch Up, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 9, 1984, at 74. 
221. The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1982), au- 
thorized a phase out of the ceilings on the maximum rates of interest and dividends that 
could be paid on deposits. 
222. Sec Fed Aopom New Capital Guidefines in Break From FDIC and OCC Actions, 43 WASH. 
FIN. REP. (B N A) 168 Uul y 30, 1984); F '  fi~poses M i t o y  Capital Rulc, Fed and OCC Ex- 
p@d to Follow, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 97 Uuly 16, 1984); Minimum Capital Staluiard For All 
Banks Under Considerafion by F '  42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 794 (May 15, 1984). 
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companies,223 although the insurance system for insurance companies is 
inadequate. It is clear that the failure of firms other than depository 
institutions can have a major effect on the financial markets. The im- 
pact of the collapse of Penn Central on the commercial paper market 
and of the attempt of Hunt family interests to corner the silver market a 
few years ago are good examples.224 The matter of brokered deposits,225 
which has pitted brokers, as well as the securities industry generally, 
against the FDIC and the FHLBB, is a good example of the conse- 
quences of a fragmented approach to safety and soundness issues. The 
FDIC and the FHLBB issued rules that would have limited the insur- 
ance coverage afforded deposits placed by or through a broker with an 
insured bank or savings and loan association to $100,000 per deposit 
broker.226 Subsequently, a federal judge declared these rules to be "un- 
lawful and void" and stated that the FDIC and the FHLBB lacked au- 
thority to deny or limit insurance to particular categories of deposits.227 
Finally, the effectiveness of dealing with risky activities by isolating 
them in separate subsidiaries of bank holding companies must be care- 
fully assessed. While there are some regulatory benefits to be derived 
from this approach, in the end it is merely an attempt to substitute pro- 
cedure for substance.228 Separate subsidiaries will not fully isolate fi- 
nancial intermediaries from the more risky activities of the holding 
223. The roles of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) and of various 
state funds to protect policyholders in the event of insurance company failure are not as well- 
publicized as those of the FDIC and FSLIC. 
224. As William M. Isaac notes in Who ShouldSupmb the Bankst: Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1984, 
at 22, col. 3, the silver market collapse and the Penn Central bankruptcy are often cited by 
the Federal Reserve Board in support of its argument that it  must be given "adequate lever- 
age in shaping the system" if it is to be called upon to "pick up the pieces in a financial crisis." 
225. Seegenernl~ FDIC Adopfs Brokered Dcposif Rulc, Calh Senate Roui~ion Zne~ccfiue, 43 WASH. 
FIN. REP. (BNA) 29 (July 9, 1984) (discussing the FDIC regulation that requires banks to 
report deposits received from money brokers or other federally insured depository institu- 
tions); Lcgslafion To Curb Brokered Deposit5 Regulations /nfroducc4 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (B NA) 
901 (May 28, 1984) (discussing bills introduced in Congress to limit the amount of short-term 
brokered deposits that a federally insured depository institution may accept). 
226. The proposed rules were set forth at 49 Fed. Reg. 2787 (1984) (proposed Jan. 23, 
1984). 
227. Judge Ovdums U S  Order Meant to End Federal Insurance for Brokered Deposits, Wall St. J., 
June 21, 1984, at 2, col. 3. 
228. Professor Robert C. Clark has suggested that: 
The most basic reason for the separation theme [is that,] absent countervailing con- 
siderations, intermediary businesses ought to be kept separate from other lines of 
business in order to facilitate the regulators' task of achieving soundness. Regulators 
can create cheaper, simpler, and more uniform reporting and recordkeeping re- 
quirements, accounting rules, examination procedures, and substantive risk-related 
rules if they do not have to contend with the possible impact on the intermediary 
business of other operations of the regulated entity. 
Clark, The Regulafion of Fimnciaf Holdng Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 789, 8 15 (1 979). 
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company affiliates. In the event of the bankruptcy of a complex com- 
pany, the use of separate subsidiaries does not necessarily protect indi- 
vidual units or subsidiaries from the effect of financial problems 
elsewhere in the company-especially when public confidence in the in- 
termediary is an essential element of each unit's viability. A recent ex- 
ample is the impact of adverse publicity about the problems of Baldwin- 
United Corporation on the level of sales and redemptions of Single Pre- 
mium Deferred Annuities issued by its life insurance subsidiaries.229 
5. Avoiding Concentration of Power.-Yet another regulatory goal is 
avoiding excessive concentration of power within a small group of finan- 
cial institutions. To some extent this goal reflects the populist distrust of 
the power of large banks which underlies many of the debates about 
deregulation of financial markets. We are not entirely free, of course, to 
choose the size of our financial institutions. They compete in worldwide 
markets and the players in those markets are very large indeed.230 In 
any case, the size of financial institutions is less important than the 
maintenance of the competition which results from broad access to fi- 
nancial services and to sources of credit. Regulation along functional 
lines will not reduce such competition and may well have the opposite 
effect. The more flexibility institutions have in offering different kinds 
of services to capital suppliers, the more vigorous should be the competi- 
tion for that capital. 
In raising capital, the business of underwriting corporate securities 
has become significantly concentrated in terms of dollar volume, with 
the top five firms accounting for over seventy percent of the business.231 
Under rule 415 and other developments, that business has come to re- 
quire large amounts of capital, thereby placing smaller investment firms 
229. Baldwin-Unriedis Now Facing Dcbrnture Woe, Wall St. J., Mar. 3 1, 1983, at 6, col. 1; How 
Bafdwrn-Unitedxaedom R'anos to Finance to Trouble, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 6. 
230. As of March 31, 1984, Citicorp had assets of $141.8 billion; BankAmerica, $121.5 
billion; Chase Manhattan, $81.8 billion; Manufacturers Hanover, $64.8 billion; and J.P. 
Morgan, $59.8 billion. Worfd Banking Surv;cy. Part I, Financial Times, May 21, 1984, 5 111, at 
VIII, col. 6 table (U.S. Banking: First Quarter, 1984). As of the quarter ending January 31, 
1984, the Royal Bank of Canada had assets of CS83.5 billion and the Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce had assets of C868.0 billion. Id at IX, col. 2 table, (Performance of Five 
Major Canadian Banks). As of December 31, 1983, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale had balance sheet assets of DM 210.0 billion, DM 
160.8 billion, and DM 139.4 billion, respectively. West Gmnnny: biking, Fimnce and Inud- 
mmt, Financial Times, July 5, 1984, 5 IV, at 11, col. 1 table, (Top 10 West German Banks). 
231. Salomon Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs occupied the top three under- 
writing positions in fiscal 1983 both in dollar volume and in number of issues, and all three 
were among the five most heavily capitalized investment banking firms. Super L e a p  Star& to 
Stretch Away, Financial Times, June 4, 1984, 5 111, at VII, col. 1. 
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at a competitive disadvantage.232 The addition of large commercial 
banks as competitors for investment banking firms might well, therefore, 
be pro-competitive. As for the availability of bank credit, there is little 
evidence of increasing concentration. There is vigorous international 
competition for the business of large borrowers, and the number of dif- 
ferent kinds of lenders serving the retail credit market continues to 
multiply. 
6: Implementation of Monetary Policy.-Finall y , any regulatory system 
must preserve the Federal Reserve Board's authority and ability to im- 
plement monetary That should not require the whole deposit 
base to be put back in "banks," but we must ensure that changes do not 
make an already inexact process more difficult. 
Regulation by institutional type, historically viewed as a simpler 
and more effective regulatory paradigm than functional regulation, is 
an approach that worked reasonably well only as long as one could 
readily distinguish between banks, insurance companies, investment 
companies, and other financial institutions. If clear and meaningful dis- 
tinctions along institutional lines can be drawn, then powerful consider- 
ations--especially the ease of defining an agency's jurisdiction and of 
determining the applicability of its rules and regulations--favor regula- 
tion by institutional type. Today, however, banks, insurance companies, 
investment companies, and securities firms often perform similar func- 
tions and promote similar products. 
In this setting, functional regulation provides a mechanism both for 
creating a "level playing field" for entities performing similar functions, 
and for achieving the regulatory goals discussed above. As Federal Re- 
serve Chairman Paul Volcker emphasized before the Senate Banking 
Committee during its consideration of the legislation that eventually 
was enacted as the Garn-St.Germain Act, "[i]nstitutions providing the 
same services should be subject to substantially the same regulations in 
providing these services, regardless of their form of organization. A 
number of the distortions and inequities in financial markets today re- 
sult from failure to adhere to this principle."234 
There are six primary financial service functions which should be 
232. Id. 
233. For an excellent discussion of the Federal Reserve's functions in the implementation 
of monetary policy, see generally P. MEEK, U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MAR- 
KETS (1982). 
234. F ~ M I I c ~ ~ ~  Imfifufionr Rcsfmcfunirg and h i c c s  Act of 1981: Hcanngs on S. 1720 Befire fhc 
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regulated by similar rules regardless of the type of financial institution 
performing the functions. They are sales, investment management, 
intermediation, custodial services, market activity, and lending. As the 
discussion below suggests, uniformity of treatment is far more attainable 
with some functions than with others. 
A. Sales 
As bank accounts, mutual funds, annuities, and other financial 
products come to compete in the same maturity spectrums for the same 
retail savings dollars, the argument for subjecting the marketing of those 
products to uniform regulation becomes quite strong. Regulation of the 
sales function should address two issues: adequate disclosure by issuers, 
and fairness by brokers and other financial services marketing personnel. 
1. The Role ofDistlos1cre.-Historically, banks have not been required 
to disclose material facts about their financial condition to retail deposi- 
tors because deposit insurance removed any "investment" aspect of the 
deposit instruments. There is surely a positive value in maintaining a 
system in which individual depositors do not feel compelled to make 
investment decisions about their short-term balances. The protection 
offered by deposit insurance has allowed the individual to place modest 
resources in the financial marketplace without the need for informed 
credit analysis. 
Individual accounts and CDs of less than $100,000, however, are 
becoming an increasingly less significant portion of the liabilities of 
large commercial banks. Large financial institutions have come to rely 
primarily on purchased funds, including the sale of large CDs in the 
United States and Eurodollar capital markets, and on repurchase agree- 
ments, federal funds, and the like.235 Such instruments, regardless of 
their term, are nothing more than debt securities and, in principle, there 
seems to be no reason why the issuers and secondary markets should be 
subject to a different set of disclosure requirements than those applicable 
to nonbank issuers of debt securities. 
Traditionally, it has been argued that the federal government can- 
not permit a major bank to fail because of the degree of economic inter- 
dependence in the financial system, and that accordingly, the credit of 
the United States stands behind all depositors, large and Thus, 
it has been said, there is no need for a system of continuous disclosure 
Comm. on Banking, Howins, and Urban AJairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 443, 450 (1981) (prepared 
statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
235. M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 68-69 (rev. ed. 1983). 
236. Stgeneral4 Edwards & Scott, mpra note 211. 
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because even the purchasers of uninsured CDs were protected. That 
approach seems to have been borne out by the response of the federal 
government to the disclosure of huge problem loans at Continental 
I l l i n ~ i s . ~ ~ '  
Another traditional reason for nondisclosure has been the avoid- 
ance of "runs on the bank" which could result from disclosure of adverse 
events. But there has been increasing skepticism about the continuing 
value of the nondisclosure approach in the case of large commercial 
banks. This skepticism appears to be shared by the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the SEC.238 
Certainly, the Continental Illinois experience has shown that delay- 
ing disclosure does not prevent runs on the bank-and the delay may 
make the final "shock loss" even worse.239 Continential Illinois repre- 
sented a serious failure of the regulatory system for which there may be 
no real solution. There was an extraordinary accumulation of bad 
loans, perhaps in the area of $5 billion, and the resulting run on the 
bank was quite serious. If large depositors had not been promised full 
protection, the impact of withdrawals could have been disastrous.240 In 
the end, there were no acceptable ready purchasers for the bank, and, 
therefore, a huge federal equity investment was required.241 
Prior to the problems at Continental Illinois, and in response to 
concerns about disclosure relating to rescheduling and possible default 
on commercial debt owed to financial institutions by foreign countries, 
the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the 
FDIC jointly proposed a five-point program of regulation.242 That pro- 
237. See Regulators, Banks A t  Together R c m  Package For Continenfal Bank, 42 WASH. FIN. 
REP. (BNA) 847, 847 (May 21, 1984). 
238. See, erg., Proposed Revision of Industry Guide Disclosures for Bank Holding Compa- 
nies, 48 Fed. Reg. 18,826 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241) (proposed Apr. 26, 
1983). 
239. See g d / l y  Treat SmaN Banks, Confinmtal Sirnilorb, Am. Banker, May 3 1, 1984, at 4 
(run on Continental Illinois followed FDIC's announcement of a "modified payoff' policy). 
240. In September 1984, Comptroller of the Currency C.T. Conover testified before Con- 
gress that, had the federal government not interceded to prevent Continental's failure, "we 
would have seen a national, if not an international, financial crisis. The dimensions were 
difficult to imagine. None of us wanted to find out." Confinm~a/JeopardzcdMany Banks, The 
Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1984, at Dl, col. 2. 
241. The assistance package to Continental Illinois included "an immediate infusion of $2 
billion in capital in the form of subordinated debt from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo- 
ration and a group of commercial banks." Regulators, Banks Put Together Rescuc Packagefor 
Continental Bank, mpra note 237, at 847. A standby facility of $5.3 billion was also arranged 
through a consortium of 24 major banks. Id. 
242. FEDERAL RESERVE, FDIC, & COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, JOINT MEMORAN- 
DUM: PROGRAM FOR IMPROVED SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEND- 
ING (Apr. 7, 1983). 
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gram involved: (a) a stricter examination of country exposure, includ- 
ing higher capital-to-loan ratios for banks with greater concentrations of 
country exposure; @) more public disclosure of the country exposure of 
banks; (c) the specification of new loan classifications: loss, reservable, 
and debt-service impaired, with requirements for write-off or provisions 
for reserves in the first two cases; (d) stretch-out of reported income from 
loan fees; and (e) increased cooperation with bank regulators abroad, 
possibly including a greater sharing of International Monetary Fund 
information.243 
While that proposal seems a little anemic in view of the hemor- 
rhage of deposits at Continental Illinois, it is probably on the right 
track. Higher capital requirments, earlier write-offs, and earlier disclo- 
sure may be the only effective means of preventing such incidents. 
Some of the negative market response to the sudden disclosure of a fi- 
nancial institution's difficulties can be attributed to the unexpected sur- 
prise associated with unfavorable information. Surprise would be 
minimized under a rule of constant or periodic disclosure. If disclosure 
were a continuous process, large depositors could adjust to unfavorable 
information by gradually reducing the flow of deposits to troubled 
institutions. 
2. Regulation 0fSale.r Practice.-The transformation of retail bank in- 
struments into investment products is a recent phenomenon. The first 
event of significance was the shortening of investors' time horizons due 
to the inflationary cycles of the 1970's and early 1980's. Because of in- 
flationary expectations, investors sought to place an increasing propor- 
tion of their savings in short-term instruments, like money market 
which were directly competitive with bank deposits. Second, 
the inflationary pressures and volatile economic conditions of the late 
1970's forced banks to change their view of the proper way to handle the 
intermediation function. Borrowing short and lending long was no 
longer perceived as an appropriate way to conduct the business of bank- 
ing. Increasing pressure to match the maturities of assets and liabilities, 
coupled with the steady lengthening of asset maturities, required banks 
to lengthen the maturity of their liabilities, producing pressure for 
longer term retail CDs. These factors have contributed to the develop- 
ment of deposit instruments which compete directly with investment in- 
struments. One clear example is the active involvement by banks in the 
243. Id. 
244. See Mutual FundAssets Up 70%, Am. Banker, Dec. 31, 1981, at 7 (the assets of money 
market funds rose from $77 billion in 1980 to $187 billion in 1981). 
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merchandising and funding of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 
which are long-term savings instruments. 
As noted above, conventional wisdom has held that insured retail 
bank deposits of less than $100,000 should not be regulated as "invest- 
ments" because there is no credit risk. It is important to remember, 
however, that regulation of sales practices is concerned with far more 
than simply disclosure of credit risk. Notions of suitability, of fair evalu- 
ation of competing alternatives, and of avoiding misleading sales prac- 
tices are as appropriate for many bank and insurance products as they 
are for stocks and bonds. Yet there is no question that different stan- 
dards have been applied to different types of financial institutions. The 
"how to become a millionaire" ads that characterized bank advertising 
for IRA products in 1982 should be contrasted with comparable ads for 
mutual fund IRA products, which are subject to SEC scrutiny. 
B. Investment Management 
Historically, different approaches were developed for the regulation 
of investment management functions depending upon whether the man- 
ager was .an insurance company, bank, trust company, or investment 
adviser, and upon whether a pension fund was involved. In each case, 
the principal regulatory concerns were the same: avoiding conflicts of 
interest, enforcing fiduciary obligations, and ensuring fairness of sales 
practices. 
Many insurance company variable account products have been as- 
similated into the Investment Company Act structure. Most commin- 
gled products offered by banks, however, whether for individual trusts 
or commingled pension fund assets, are exempt from SEC regulation, 
while analogous nonbank products are not. The regulatory ground 
rules should be the same regardless of the managing entity. There is no 
reason why an independent investment manager who manages assets of 
pension funds and other institutions should be regulated by the SEC 
while such a manager working for a bank is not. Both should be subject 
to the same rules governing advertising and fiduciary obligations. 
C Intermediation 
The historical distinction between intermediation and investment 
management is based on allocation of risk: only through the latter pro- 
cess does the customer retain the primary risk of loss. In view of this 
distinction, only intermediation has been regulated to ensure safety and 
soundness. Today, however, banks float the return on money market 
accounts with market rates, and many insurance products permit the 
insurer to change the returns periodically. It seems clear that the varia- 
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bility or "equity" nature of these returns does not make the bank or 
insurance company less of an intermediary for which safety and sound- 
ness regulation is appropriate. An intermediary may offer "equity prod- 
ucts," and if it does, then many of the investment management rules 
should apply to it. But if the assets managed are legally the property of 
the manager and are available to the manager's creditors, then regula- 
tion as an intermediary is also appropriate. 
The money market fund pushed this traditional distinction to the 
limit. The fund is an equity product, and the assets are plainly not the 
property of the investment manager. But just as plainly, when over 
$220 billion of the deposit base moves out of banks and into money 
market much of it subject to at least rudimentary checking 
powers, something new has happened. As so often occurs in the finan- 
cial services industry, however, the regulatory system adapted to ac- 
comodate this hybrid. In order to compete with banks, money market 
funds sought permission from the SEC to quote their shares at a stable 
net asset value of one dollar per share-distinctly not an "equity prod- 
uct" way to value the shares of an investment company. The SEC, 
whose regulatory domain extends to the valuation of investment compa- 
nies' net assets, responded by regulating the quality of the asset base of 
money market funds, although technically it lacked authority to do so. 
The SEC informed the money market funds that if they wished to value 
their shares at a stable net asset value-which implies that portfolio in- 
vestments will be held to maturity and few losses will be realized-then 
they would be required to confine their investments to both high quality 
assets and short average maturities.246 The result has been a fairly high 
degree of ad hoc safety and soundness regulation, lacking only federal 
"deposit" insurance. 
Intermediation is the area in which uniformity of regulation fits 
least comfortably. Differences between the asset and liability structures 
of banks, savings and loan associations, investment companies, and in- 
surance companies have resulted in varied approaches to the regulation 
of the soundness and capital adequacy of these institutions. In the case 
of banks, for example, reserve requirements, capital adequacy require- 
ments, and loan ceilings for single borrowers are among the require- 
245. Gross, Yisn Hal& Phn~ fm Moncy Fund, Am. Banker, Dec. 1, 1982, at 1 (quoting state- 
ment of Visa U.S.A.). 
246. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, RELEASE NO. IC-13380, VALUATION OF DEBT 
INSTRUMENTS AND COMPUTATION F CURRENT PRICE PER SHARE BY CERTAIN OPEN-END 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES (July l I ,  1983) (Money market funds). 
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ments imposed by the federal regulators to ensure institutional safety 
and soundness.247 
Investment companies, although chartered under state law, are reg- 
ulated by the SEC under the Investment Company Act, which empha- 
sizes reporting and disclosure, stringent conflict-of-interest rules, and the 
prevention of fraudulent and unfair sales practices.248 The Act's pri- 
mary focus is on the role of outside directors, rather than on regulatory 
supervision.249 The Act also emphasizes simple capital structures. As 
Clark notes, "[investment company] capital structure regulation is so 
severe that it virtually eliminates worries about investment company 
soundness in the formal sense of freedom from danger of insolvency: be- 
cause of the limitations on debt an open-end investment company could 
hardly ever 'fail' in a discrete sense."250 The regulatory requirements 
imposed on insurance companies by state insurance commissioners, on 
the other hand, strictly regulate investments and disallow certain risky 
assets.251 
A function somewhat related to both intermediation and invest- 
ment management is the holding of customer or client funds for safe- 
keeping, either with or without any investment management 
function.252 Since the funds remain the property of the customer, the 
custodian is not an intermediary. Such services only involve safekeeping 
responsibilities, and therefore are different from intermediation and are 
separable from investment management. The custodial services func- 
tion lends itself to a high degree of uniformity in regulation. 
247. For example, the Federal Reserve System has issued regulations relating to the reserve 
requirements of all insured banks (as defined at 12 U.S.C. 5 181301) (1982)). See 12 C.F.R. 
$5 204.1-.I23 (1984). Also, the Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated regulations 
controlling the lending limits of unsecured loans. See 12 C.F.R. 55 32.1-,111 (1984). Finally, 
capital adequacy requirements have been the subject of recent proposals by the Federal Re- 
serve Board, the Comptroller, and the FDIC. See Federal Rcmc Board Roposed Capifal Adequacy 
Cuidcline~, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. (B NA) 235 (Aug. 6, 1984); FD/C Roposcd Rule Edabliihing New 
Capifof Adtquq Lcucl, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 156 (July 23, 1984); see also supra note 222. 
248. El . ,  15 U.S.C. $8 80a-9 to -11, -13, -17 (1982). 
249. See, for example, section 10 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-10 
(1982), which sets forth prohibitions on affiliations of the directors of investment companies. 
250. Clark, T h  Soundness o/Fimncial Znfmncdtaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1976). 15 U.S.C. 
5 80a-18(0 (1982) provides that open-end investment companies are not permitted to issue 
senior securities and that borrowings from banks must meet a 300% asset coverage test. 
251. s t ,  c.g., N.Y. INSURANCE LAW $ 81 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1983) (outlining spe- 
cific requirements to be met by the reserve investments of a domestic insurer). 
252. The basic rule established by the case law is that the relationship between a bank and 
its depositors is that of debtor and creditor, not of agent and principal. See, e.g., Kress v. 
Central Trust Co., 246 A.D. 76, 78,283 N.Y.S. 467,469 (1935), a f d ,  272 N.Y. 629, 5 N.E.2d 
365 (1936); Amsden v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 182 A.D. 474,475-76, 170 N.Y.S. 316,317 (1918); 
General Fire Assurance Co. v. State Bank, 177 A.D. 745, 750, 164 N.Y.S. 871, 874 (1917). 
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The function of acting as broker or dealer includes activities on 
both the organized exchanges and the nonexchange dealer markets. In 
this area there is a pressing need for consistency. Banks are exempt from 
registration under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as broker- 
dealers.253 They are permitted to engage in at least some brokerage 
functions,254 but those are regulated by bank regulators255 that are 
themselves questioning the adequacy of this regulatory structure.256 
Similarly, there seems little basis for the different regulatory schemes for 
financial futures, which are regulated by the CFTC, and financial op- 
tions, which are within the province of the SEC.257 Both types of op- 
tions are used by many of the same customers and serve the same 
economic functions. Furthermore, there is no good reason why banks 
should be permitted to act as futures commission merchants but be 
barred from dealing in options. Finally, it seems no more consistent 
with safety and soundness considerations for a bank to deal in the highly 
volatile currency and treasury securities markets than for it to deal in 
investment grade securities. But if banks are permitted to expand their 
broker and dealer functions, they should be regulated like other broker- 
dealers. 
253. 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(4)-(5) (1982). 
254. 12 U.S.C. 5 24 (1982) provides in pertinent part that: 
[tlhe business of dealing in securities by the [national bank] shall be limited to 
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the 
order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the 
[national bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock; fiouidcdthat the 
[national bank] may purchase for its own account investment securities under such 
limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation 
prescribe. 
See also 49 Fed. Reg. 15,089 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 5 5.52) (rules proposed Apr. 
17, 1984, by the Comptroller of the Currency dealing with brokerage activities of national 
banks). A proposal for conducting brokerage services through separate subsidiaries has been 
the subject of discussion between the SEC and the comptroller. Albert, CompfroflerJoim Grow- 
ing Ifolesf Agaimf SEC Plan on Bank Brokers, Am. Banker, Feb. l 7, 1984, at l .  
255. The  regulations of the comptroller dealing with securities purchases by banks for their 
own account are found at 12 C.F.R. $5 1.1-.I40 (1984). 
256. S. 2851, the proposed "Financial Services Competitive Equity Act," seeks to address 
some of these concerns, but retains the authority of bank regulators over certain securities 
activities of banks. The  bill allows depository institutions, through nondepository affiliates, to 
underwrite mortgage-backed securities, commercial paper, and all types of municipal revenue 
bonds. These activities have been described by Senator Garn as "conservative, safe and  sound 
securities activities which are closely related to the traditional business of depository institu- 
tions." [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) No. 1038, at 3-5 (Aug. 24, 1984). 
257. See Ackerman, SEC, CFTC Set Sfagefir Tramfimzafion of Markcfs, Legal Times, Feb. 15, 
1982, at  36. 
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Interestingly, lending is the area in which functional regulation is 
the most advanced in terms of uniformity of both regulation and admin- 
istration. Usury truth-in-lending legislation,259 margin 
credit,260 and similar regulatory systems tend to apply with equal force 
to all lenders. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Is it necessary to make the effort to create a new paradigm? In our 
view, the fragmentation in the current regulatory system has become so 
counterproductive that the creation of a new regulatory paradigm has 
become essential. When the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptrol- 
ler of the Currency are at open war over the status of nonbank banks 
under the Bank Holding Company Act and the Secretary of the Treas- 
ury has to make peace by asking for a r n o r a t o r i ~ m , ~ ~ '  when literally 
hundreds of billions of dollars of the deposit base flow from banks to 
money market funds and back to bank money market accounts,262 and 
when the CFTC must negotiate with the SEC about whether the CFTC 
should approve a new futures product for trading,263 then our nation's 
regulation of its financial services industry is not being implemented in a 
way that is consistent with the public interest. It is time to develop a 
new paradigm for the regulation of financial functions and institutions, 
not by putting a fresh coat of paint on an old structure, but by starting 
anew with a regulatory blueprint drafted along functional lines. 
258. See, e.g., The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-221,s 501,94 Stat. 132, 161 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 5 1735f- 
7 (1982)). 
259. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection (Truth in Lending) Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 
Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 1601 (1982)). 
260. Sce, e.g., 12 C.F.R. s 220.1-.I30 (1984). 
261. St Comptroller of the Currency, News Release No. NR 83-27 (Apr. 5, 1983); see aLro 
Fuerbringer, Regan Urges Dclq in LrJing of Banking Industy Barrius, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1983, 
at D6, col. 1. 
262. See supra note 245. 
263. See supra note 257. 
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